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SERVING TWO MASTERS: EVALUATING THE
CRIMINAL OR CIVIL NATURE OF THE VWPA
AND MVRA THROUGH THE LENS OF THE EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE, THE ABATEMENT
DOCTRINE, AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Brian Kleinhaus*
INTRODUCTION
Restitution has been described as a "court-imposed sanction,' a
"valuable and meaningful remedy,"'2 a "rehabilitative tool,"3 a
"punitive measure,"4 and an "equity tool"5 to help make "victims
'whole."' 6 The concept of restitution-an offender compensating a
victim for a wrong the offender inflicted on the victim-goes back
millennia and is recorded in the writings of the early civilization of
Sumer over four thousand years ago.7 The treatment of restitution as
a method of punishment and or compensation, and its incorporation
into state criminal law has been inconsistent over time.' Recently,
restitution has found a home in the federal criminal system, where it
has the potential to expose criminal defendants to huge financial
penalties.9
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Dan Richman for his excellent role as devil's advocate. I would also like to
thank my parents, Annie and Sylvain Kleinhaus, and especially my wife Ariella and
my daughter Dahlia, for all their support.
1. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Victim/Witness Legislation: An Overview 8 (1984).
2. Id. at 9.
3. Barbara E. Smith et al., Improving Enforcement of Court-Ordered




7. See Robert Francis Harper, The Code of Hammurabi King of Babylon About
2250 B.C., at 13 (1904) ("If a man steal ox or sheep,... or boat-if it be from a god
(temple) or a palace, he shall restore thirtyfold; if it be from a freeman, he shall
render tenfold. If the thief have nothing wherewith to pay he shall be put to death.").
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding
the majority of a $27,397,206.84 restitution order against a defendant who embezzled
money and stock shares from the Cisco Corporation); United States v. Bedonie, 317
F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1311, 1329 (D. Utah 2004) (awarding restitution orders of $446,665
and $325,751, respectively, to two families of homicide victims to replace the lost
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Since the passage by Congress of the Victims Witness and
Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA")," defendants in the federal
criminal system who are convicted of an offense at trial or who plead
to an offense in a plea agreement have faced not only the prospect of
jail terms and fines, but also the potential imposition of an order of
restitution to pay money to the victims injured by their crimes." The
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 ("MVRA") 12 partially
superseded and augmented the VWPA and now requires that federal
judges impose restitution on defendants convicted of certain offenses
to the fullest extent possible, regardless of their ability to pay. 3
The use of restitution as a tool in the arsenal of federal judges when
sentencing a defendant has led to a contentious debate among the
federal circuits over the exact purpose of a restitution order.14 This
discussion has centered around whether restitution imposed during
sentencing is considered criminal punishment, a civil sanction
designed exclusively to compensate victims without regard for the
punitive functions of restitution, or some amalgam of these two
goals.15 The explicit function of restitution has not been defined by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of the VWPA or MVRA.16
And yet the answer to the civil-criminal question has direct
income of the deceased, even though the defendants had no assets); see also Michael
J. Gilbert, Restitution Issues Lurk in Federal Cases: Many Are Likely to Surface in
Major Prosecutions and Will Also Be Relevant in Less Notorious, but Similar, Cases,
Nat'l Law J., Mar. 29, 2004, at S1 (noting that the "restitution laws are ripe for some
significant activity," and "[i]t may well be that, with a few high-profile, expansive
restitution orders, restitution will quickly be transformed from remaining an
afterthought to becoming a central concern in federal criminal prosecutions")
(emphasis added).
10. See Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., with the restitution provision at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)).
11. Prior to 1982, federal judges could, at their discretion, impose restitution on
defendants solely as a condition of probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651, repealed by Pub.
L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(1)-(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
12. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204(a), 110 Stat. 1227 (1996) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2000)).
13. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2004) ("In each order of restitution, the
court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as
determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of
the defendant."). Both the Victims Witness and Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA")
and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 ("MVRA") are to be enforced in
accordance with § 3664. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d); id. § 3663A(d); see also infra Part
I.C.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2001) ("A survey
of case law illustrates that restitution is best classified as compensatory, punitive, or a
combination of both according to the context in which the issue arises."); see also
infra Part II.
16. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 n.4 (1990) (stating in dicta that
a goal of the VWPA is to compensate victims); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49
n.10, 50-53 (1986) (holding that restitution imposed as part of a state criminal
sentence was penal in nature and not dischargeable as a debt in a bankruptcy
proceeding).
SERVING TWO MASTERS
ramifications for convicted defendants facing sentences that include
restitution orders.
Determining the civil or criminal purpose of restitution authorized
by the VWPA and MVRA specifically affects the reach of two
constitutional principles and a prudential doctrine: application of the
Ex Post Facto Clause 7 of the United States Constitution to the
restitution statutes, the extension of the abatement doctrine18 to cover
restitution orders, and the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of having a jury-in a criminal trial 9-find beyond a reasonable doubt
all facts necessary for the punishment of a defendant.
Depending on the circuit in which a defendant is brought to stand
trial, the classification of restitution will affect whether a convicted
defendant can challenge a restitution order under the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the state and federal
governments from passing laws that have a retroactive effect, but it
only applies to statutes that increase criminal punishment for crimes
that occurred before the passage of the statute.20  A statute that
increases the civil remedies that can be imposed upon a defendant will
not be prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause, while one that
increases criminal punishment will be. 21 The purpose of restitution
orders authorized by the VWPA and MVRA becomes an issue when
these statutes are applied to crimes that occurred prior to the statutes'
passage or amendment.2
Courts also implicate the civil-criminal classification question when
applying the abatement doctrine to the sentences of convicted
defendants who die before their appeal as of right is heard.
Generally, the abatement doctrine mandates that the indictment,
conviction, prison term, and fine of a defendant who dies before his
direct appeal is heard abate with his death, and become null and
void.23 However, there is a federal circuit split as to whether criminal
restitution orders imposed under the VWPA or MVRA abate along
with the rest of the defendant's record. In the same vein as the ex
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed."); U.S.
Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any... ex post facto Law."); see also
infra Part II.A (discussing the relevance of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the VWPA
and MVRA).
18. See infra Part I.F.2 (describing the abatement doctrine).
19. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .....
20. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalU.) 386, 390-91 (1798).
21. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (finding that a civil
commitment of a sex offender did not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy
Clauses).
22. See United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the
circuit split and collecting cases from circuits on either side of the ex post facto
argument).
23. See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 413 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004)
(collecting cases from the federal circuits that follow the abatement doctrine).
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post facto analysis, the issue of whether a restitution order abates with
the death of a convicted defendant awaiting appeal is dependent, to a
significant extent, on the circuit's view of restitution as either a
criminal punishment or a civil remedy. 4
The newest constitutional area involving restitution orders and a
criminal defendant's ability to challenge his sentence stems from the
Supreme Court's rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey25 and Blakely v.
Washington.26  These two cases, whose judgments were recently
affirmed in United States v. Booker,27 currently define the Court's
understanding of the role of a jury in criminal cases, and the scope of
the protection the Sixth Amendment affords to criminal defendants.
Based on Apprendi, Blakely, and now Booker, defendants facing
criminal sentences have recently raised a new challenge regarding the
constitutionality of restitution orders authorized by the VWPA and
MVRA. These appeals argue that restitution orders act as criminal,
not civil, punishment, and thus constitute an increase in the
punishment of a defendant based on facts found by a judge-not the
jury-and by a lower standard of evidence than is required to
convict;28 therefore the VWPA and MVRA violate a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all facts necessary
for sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt.29 Again, this novel Sixth
24. See infra Part II.B (discussing the abatement doctrine and how the federal
circuits disagree over its application to restitution orders).
25. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
26. 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004). Although Blakely was a case about Washington
State sentencing guidelines, the decision had clear ramifications for the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines -and potentially, for federal restitution statutes. See id. at 2549
("The structure of the Federal Guidelines likewise does not ... provide any grounds
for distinction [from the Washington State guidelines].") (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see also infra Part II.D (regarding the potential application of Blakely to the federal
restitution statutes). In fact, soon after Blakely, the Court granted certiorari and
heard oral arguments on two cases where the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
challenged for violating the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges to sentence
defendants to increased prison terms based on facts that were not put to a jury.
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 11
(Aug. 2, 2004); Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *1 (D. Me.
June 28, 2004), cert. granted before judgment by United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12
(Aug. 2, 2004). The challenge was successful, as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were declared unconstitutional in January 2005. See United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005) (affirming the reasoning of Apprendi and Blakely, holding that
their reasoning applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and finding that the
Guidelines were only advisory).
27. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57.
28. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(e) (2004) (requiring a judge to resolve any conflict as
to the size of a restitution order by a preponderance of the evidence).
29. See infra Part II.D (analyzing the Sixth Amendment challenge to the VWPA
and MVRA). At least one federal district court judge, without explicitly analyzing
the Sixth Amendment issue, has held that the MVRA is unconstitutional on its face.
See United States v. Kemp, 938 F. Supp. 1554, 1566 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (calling the
MVRA "so fundamentally flawed and confused that it cannot be interpreted or
judicially nudged into constitutionality"). The judge has reiterated the same opinion
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Amendment argument against the VWPA and MVRA would be
directly affected by categorizing restitution as either criminal
punishment or a civil remedy.
The Ex Post Facto Clause, the abatement doctrine, and the Sixth
Amendment constitutionality of the VWPA and MVRA demonstrate
the current tension over determining if the restitution statutes are
criminal or civil in nature.3" The granting of a petition of certiorari by
the Supreme Court on an appropriate case to decide the character of
restitution authorized by the VWPA and MVRA would go a long way
towards resolving this tension and creating uniformity in this facet of
the sentencing of criminal defendants in the federal court system.
This Note argues that restitution is, and always has been, an
additional method of punishing defendants that also increases
society's recognition of the harm done to the individual victim of the
crime, and that therefore restitution orders should be universally
understood as criminal punishment. The legislative history of the
VWPA and MVRA lends significant support to this Note's contention
that Congress was aware of, and agreed with, the punitive and
compensatory intent of restitution. The recent efforts by some federal
courts to separate the underlying principle of restitution as
punishment from its co-underlying principle of restitution as
compensation have led to judicial decisions that are inconsistent with
these original twin aims.3 Therefore, this Note asserts that restitution
should never be separated from its penal, rehabilitative core, even if it
also has a compensatory core as well.
Part I of this Note provides a short overview of the historical
background and purpose of restitution. Part L.A examines the use of
restitution as a method of settling private conflicts in early human
societies, and its decline over time in favor of a state-imposed and
society-centered punishment regime. Part I.B briefly discusses the
revival of interest in the use of restitution in the latter half of the
in multiple cases. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1314-15
(N.D. Ala. 2002). No other federal court has endorsed this line of reasoning to rule
on the constitutionality of the MVRA.
30. An additional issue raised by the placement of restitution in the criminal
sentencing process via the VWPA and MVRA is whether the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial for suits at common law is violated. See Bonnie Arnett Von
Roeder, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 671, 673-74 (1984) (arguing that the
VWPA violates the Seventh Amendment by not providing a jury trial for the
determination of restitution amounts); see also Margaret Raymond, Note, The
Unconstitutionality of the Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the Seventh
Amendment, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1590, 1591-92 (1984) (same). No federal circuit court
of appeal that has considered this argument has accepted it. See United States v.
Rostoff, 164 F.3d 63, 70-71 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790,
800-01 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that restitution as a criminal remedy "predates the
Seventh Amendment"). See infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the Seventh Amendment and restitution.
31. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
2005] 2715
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
twentieth century-including the rise of the victims' rights
movement-as part of an overall increase in societal concern with
violent crime and how to respond to it.
Part I.C describes the two main federal statutes that federal judges
use to impose restitution on convicted defendants, the VWPA and the
MVRA. This part reviews the legislative history of the statutes, and
shows that the legislative record references the punitive and
compensatory goals of restitution in many instances. The legislative
history shows the dual interests of Congress in compensating crime
victims through the penal imposition of restitution. Part I.D examines
the Supreme Court's views on the intent of restitution. Part I.E
presents the development of the Supreme Court's current test to
evaluate whether a statute that imposes penalties serves a criminal or
civil purpose. Part I.F gives the relevant background for the
discussion in Part II of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the abatement
doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment and their relation to restitution
orders authorized by the VWPA and MVRA.
Part II of this Note examines three legal issues that are implicated
by the federal circuit splits in determining whether restitution orders
authorized by the VWPA and MVRA are criminal punishment.
Specifically, Part IIA reviews early federal VWPA decisions and
considers the circuit split as it applies to the ex post facto analysis of
the VWPA and MVRA. Part II.B discusses the circuit divide on
whether restitution orders should abate when a convicted defendant
has appealed his conviction as of right, but dies before the court has
ruled on his appeal. Part II.C details how the lack of consistency in
the treatment of restitution orders by the federal courts has also led to
incompatible decisions within individual circuits. Part II.D explores
how the Apprendi32 and Blakely33 cases have led to a new legal
challenge to restitution orders, namely that restitution orders pursuant
to the VWPA and MVRA violate the Sixth Amendment by increasing
punishment beyond the statutory maximum based on facts that have
neither been presented to a jury nor found beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Part III concludes that the use of the Court's test and legislative
history to interpret the VWPA and MVRA ultimately results in an
answer that restitution serves two masters-criminal and civil. This
part contends that even though restitution can be interpreted to be all
things to all people, restitution ordered under the VWPA and MVRA
should never be deemed exclusively compensatory.
Part III then suggests that the Supreme Court should find a proper
case to consider this matter and decide that although restitution has a
compensatory function, it is too wrapped up historically in the concept
32. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
33. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2716 [Vol. 73
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of punishment for restitution orders imposed by the VWPA and
MVRA to be solely compensatory in nature. Barring a holding by the
Supreme Court that all restitution orders under the VWPA and
MVRA have a criminal penalty component that cannot be ignored,
this Note proposes that for some restitution orders compensatory
purposes will dominate over punitive interests, and vice versa.
Determining the purpose of restitution orders under this proposal will
hinge on differentiating between the types of victims who receive the
benefits of restitution orders.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE VWPA AND
MVRA
This part provides the setting necessary for discussing the conflicts
in Part II over the definition of restitution orders as criminal or civil.
A. A Brief Historical Review of Restitution
Restitution was an early method of settling disputes between
private parties.34 The Code of Hammurabi35 and the Bible36 contain
references to a preference for restitution over physical punishment for
crimes of theft. These texts, which call for repayment over and above
the value of the stolen item, imply that the purpose of restitution was
more than victim compensation; it was also to punish the offender.37
Although the historical record is not complete, later evidence from
Germanic tribes at the end of the Middle Ages indicates that
restitution, as part of a system known as composition, was used as a
method of settling feuds between tribes and was favored over violent
means of retaliation for physical acts.38 As part of the evolution of
state criminal law, governments exerted their control over the
composition system and began to demand part of the payment being
made from one private party to the other.39 In medieval England, a
34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 7.
36. See Exodus 22:9 (King James), available at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2?id=KjvExod.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed
&tag=public&part=22&division=divl (last visited Mar. 20, 2005) ("For all manner of
trespass,.... or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the
cause of both parties shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall
condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour.").
37. See Stephen Schafer, Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime 3-4
(2d ed. 1970).
38. See id. at 5. Schafer makes the point that restitution in Germanic tribal society
served to humiliate the offender and it could also be suitably viewed as a method of
tort compensation rather than a part of "criminal procedure." Id.
39. Id. at 6.
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person found guilty of an offense paid monetary compensation both
to the injured person and to the feudal lord.4"
Eventually, as criminal law became more developed, the idea of
payments between individuals became associated with tort or civil
law; the state completely took over the administration of criminal law,
and restitution became mostly divorced from the arena of state
punishment.4' Although restitution became mostly separated from
state-run criminal trials, writings by several influential thinkers over
the past few centuries continued to display an interest in using
restitution as a penal and compensatory tool.42 Several international
penal conferences during the late nineteenth century discussed placing
restitution back into the sphere of criminal law, but the dialogue did
not accomplish this goal.43
Yet restitution did not completely disappear from the criminal
realm. Evidence exists that restitution continued to be meted out by
judges in common law England as part of a criminal sentence. 44
40. See id. at 7. The fine to the victim was known as the Bot, and the fine to the
king was known as the Wite. Id.
41. See id. Schafer blames the separation of personal restitution from criminal
law, and its original dual goal of punishment and compensation, on the avarice of
feudal lords. The lords completely appropriated the fines that were once exchanged
between individual parties for their state coffers; the concomitant result was that the
rights of victims in the state criminal system were ignored and minimized. Id. at 8; see
also infra Part I.B (discussing the victims' rights movement). Compare Schafer, supra
note 37, at 8, with Gilbert Geis, Restitution by Criminal Offenders: A Summary and
Overview, in Restitution in Criminal Justice 147, 150 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway
eds., 1977) [hereinafter Criminal Justice] (arguing that the takeover of criminal justice
by the state was less about greed and more about a "reaction to popular distress at the
awfulness of existing criminal justice arrangements").
42. See The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: 'Legislator of the World':
Writings on Codification, Law and Education 210-11 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan
Harris eds., 1998). Bentham notes:
Only, if, for the sake of the community at large, punishment is inflicted, if
there be any shape by which, without encrease [sic] of suffering to the wrong
doer, satisfaction to the individual wronged may be administered, that shape
may be employed.
By that shape, the apprehension of the eventual punishment may,
moreover, be rendered the more impressive upon the mind of him on who
the temptation to do the wrong is operating.
Id. See generally Bruce Jacob, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, in
Criminal Justice, supra note 41, at 45, 48 (citing to Sir Thomas More's Utopia in 1516
and Jeremy Bentham's writings in the eighteenth century).
43. See Jacob, supra note 42, at 48-49.
44. See 4 William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries 362-63 (St. George
Tucker ed., 1803) (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996) [hereinafter Tucker's
Blackstone] (observing that under English common law, upon a conviction for larceny
by a jury, a judge was authorized to issue a writ of restitution to the victim of the
robbery to reclaim the value of his lost property out of the property of the offender,
because the "law prefers the right of the owner"); see also J.H. Baker, An
Introduction to English Legal History 440-41, 574-75 (3d ed. 1990) (referring to
restitution as a criminal proceeding that had the dual result of punishing the
defendant and restoring the stolen property to the victim).
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Support for the use of restitution as a punitive tool in early federal
criminal law in the United States exists as well. In 1802, the U.S.
Congress passed a statute that criminalized any act of robbery,
larceny, or trespass on Indian tribal territory by a U.S. citizen, and
imposed a fine, jail time, and monetary restitution on any offender as
punishment. 5  This statute adds support to the historical
understanding and use of restitution as an effective element of state
punishment of criminal acts.46
B. Revival of Interest in Restitution in the Latter Half of the Twentieth
Century
Despite the historical record of the consideration of restitution as a
criminal remedy, restitution existed as an infrequently used tool in the
federal criminal system through most of the twentieth century.47
Federal judges, acting pursuant to the Federal Probation Act of
1925,48 could impose restitution on offenders only as a condition of
probation.49
The modern revitalization of interest in reinstituting restitution as
part of the criminal sentencing process traces its origins to the writings
of Margery Fry5" and the victims' rights movement in the 1970s and
1980s. 1 The victims' rights movement arose as a response to a
45. See An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to
Preserve Peace on the Frontiers, 2 Stat. 139 (1802), which states in part:
That if any... citizen, or other person, shall go into any town, settlement or
territory, belonging.., to any nation or tribe of Indians, and shall there
commit robbery, larceny, trespass or other crime, against the person or
property of any friendly Indian or Indians, which would be punishable, if
committed within the jurisdiction of any state, against a citizen of the United
States .... such offender shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one hundred
dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding twelve months; and shall also,
when property is taken or destroyed, forfeit and pay to such Indian or
Indians, to whom the property taken and destroyed belongs, a sum equal to
twice the just value of the property ... and if such offender shall be unable
to pay [that sum], whatever such payment shall fall short of the said just
value, shall be paid out of the treasury of the United States.
Id. at 141. See generally 5 Tucker's Blackstone, supra note 44, at 72-73 n.14 (referring
to the above statute as an example of Congress incorporating the concept of
protecting foreign nationals from the Law of Nations into its own statutes).
46. See infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text.
47. See S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536
("As simple as the principle of restitution is, it lost its priority status in the sentencing
procedures of our federal courts long ago.").
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (2000), repealed or renumbered by Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(a)(1)-(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
49. See id. § 3651 ("While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the
defendant ... [m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties
for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had.").
50. See Criminal Justice, supra note 41, at 151.
51. See Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson, Introduction to Criminal Justice,
Restitution, and Reconciliation 1, 3 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990)
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societal fear of crime in America.52 The movement's main grievance
was that all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the police,
the district attorney's office, and the judge were too focused on
protecting the civil rights of offenders at the expense of victims.5 3
The goal of the movement was to force the justice system to realign
itself to better represent the interests of victims. 4 As part of that
overall goal, the movement urged several substantive changes,
including that offenders be required to make full monetary restitution
to the victims of their criminal acts.55 The movement's success and
influence was evidenced by the formation of a task force on crime
authorized by President Reagan, which, in its final report in 1982,
echoed the desires of most victims: increased significance of victims'
rights in the administration of criminal justice. 6
The task force made numerous specific recommendations to the
state and federal legislatures and executive branches, police,
prosecutors, judiciaries, parole boards, and other groups regarding a
[hereinafter Restitution and Reconciliation] (pointing to the establishment of the
Minnesota Restitution Center in 1972).
52. See Robert Reiff, The Invisible Victim: The Criminal Justice System's
Forgotten Responsibility 21-22 (1979) (arguing that the true number of violent crimes
in the United States in 1976 was close to two million, double what the official FBI
statistics claimed, with an attendant three- to five-million victims); cf. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, President's Task Force on Victims of Crime vi (1982) [hereinafter Task Force
I] (citing dramatic crime statistics that show a murder in America happening every
twenty-three minutes, a rape every six minutes, and claiming that half of violent crime
goes unreported).
53. See Reiff, supra note 52, at xi. Reiff states:
The police are required by law to respect concrete and specific rights of
offenders but they are blind to the rights of victims .... If the police officer
or district attorney decides not to... arrest, or not to prosecute an offender,
or to allow the offender to plea bargain his way out of the charge, the victim
has no legal recourse.
The courts, too, conspire against victims by cheating them out of even the
most civilized ... forms of retribution thus robbing them of a sense of
justice.
Id.; see also Lois Haight Herrington, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreword to
Victim/Witness Legislation: An Overview iii (1984) ("The [criminal] system has
always depended on the cooperation of victims... ; yet it has accorded victims none
of the protections or rights guaranteed to defendants.").
54. See Reiff, supra note 52, at 15 (advocating that the "balance on the scale of
justice is out of kilter").
55. See generally id. at 114 (listing a Victims' Bill of Rights, including a "right to
be made whole again as a matter of social justice"). Congress has since codified rights
of criminal victims. See The Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, §§ 501-06, 104 Stat. 4789, 4820 (codifying the right to restitution as part of a
litany of rights afforded to crime victims at 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (2000)), repealed by
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-64. The
Justice For All Act placed a slightly revised version of the same list of rights in 18
U.S.C.A. § 3771 (2004). See § 102, 118 Stat. at 2261 (setting forth the revised list of
rights, including restitution as right number six).
56. See Task Force I, supra note 52, at 16 ("The legislative and executive
branches, at both the state and federal level, must pass and enforce laws that...
recognize society's interest in assisting the innocent to recover from victimization.").
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whole spectrum of issues.57 Most important to the analysis of this
Note, it pushed for mandatory restitution orders in all cases where
victims had suffered a loss, including a requirement that a judge who
did not impose restitution state compelling reasons on the record why
restitution was denied in a specific case.58 In urging restitution, the
task force stated that "Itlhe concept of personal accountability for the
consequences of one's conduct, and the allied notion that the person
who causes the damage should bear the cost, are at the heart of civil
law. It should be no less true in criminal law."
59
In 1986, the task force published a follow-up report that detailed
the various changes that had occurred in the criminal justice system at
the national, state, and local levels. It noted that the passage of the
VWPA in 1982 had codified many of the pro-victim positions from the
initial task force report, including the imposition of restitution
orders.6' The number of states requiring restitution had risen from
eight to twenty-nine. 61  In a phrase that displays the movement's
interest in ensuring that criminals continue to be held more personally
accountable for their crimes, the foreword to the 1986 report exhorted
society to "remember that the responsibility for crime lies with those
who commit it, not with those forced to endure it."' 62 The advocacy of
criminal restitution orders was one factor the movement saw as an
effective example of the increased personal accountability of
criminals. The information contained in the task force report
indicates that victims and their advocates wanted the legislature to
change all aspects of the criminal justice system to be more sensitive
to individual victims and less monolithic in its approach to dispensing
justice. In pushing for criminals to pay restitution to their victims, the
task force reports showed a desire for the legislature to more fully
adopt the notion of personal responsibility from civil tort law into
criminal law.63
The passage of the federal restitution statutes can be viewed as a
principal part of Congress's response to these societal demands. By
making restitution a part of the criminal sentencing process, Congress
made defendants more personally liable to their victims. Part I.C will
57. See id. at 57, 63, 72, 83, 88.
58. See id. at 33, 72.
59. See id. at 79. There are contrary views of the efforts to bring victims' interests
into the state criminal justice system. See, e.g., Gregory P. Orvis, The Evolving Law of
Victims' Rights: Potential Conflicts with Criminal Defendants' Due Process Rights and
the Superiority of Civil Court Remedies 163, 170 in Current Issues in Victimology
Research (Laura J. Moriarty & Robert A. Jerin eds., 1998) (arguing that the victims'
rights movement, by merging "criminal and civil justice processes," has "diminish[ed]
the purpose of both").
60. U.S. Dep't of Justice, President's Task Force on Victims of Crime Four Years
Later 16-17 (1986) [hereinafter Task Force II].
61. See id. at 4.
62. See id. at iii.
63. See supra notes 57, 60 and accompanying text.
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look at the VWPA and the MVRA and focus on whether adding
restitution orders to defendants' sentences indicated Congress's intent
to add a punitive measure to defendants' sentences, or a civil
compensatory remedy for victims.
C. The Federal Restitution Statutes
The VWPA was passed in 1 98 2.' Congress declared that one of the
purposes of the act was to "ensure that the Federal Government does
all that is possible ... to assist victims and witnesses of crime without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the defendant."6  The
VWPA codified several recommendations of the Task Force on
Crime, including the use of victim impact statements in pre-sentence
reports to calculate the harm to any victim.66 These pre-sentence
reports would then be used to help the judge craft a restitution
order.67 In the original statutory text, a restitution order was available
to the judge when sentencing a defendant who was convicted of any
crime under Title 18 of the United States Code.' Restitution for any
offense was completely discretionary, could be ordered "in addition or
in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law," and could be imposed
for only part of the victim's losses.69 In crafting the amount of the
order, a court was instructed to consider not only the loss to the
victim, but also the financial situation of the defendant, including his
ability to make a living and any dependents he might have.7" An
order could entail return of actual tangible property, or encompass
any costs associated with lost income, medical services, and/or funeral
expenses that a victim experienced; if the victim of the offense died,
his estate would receive the restitution.71 Any amount of restitution
received by a victim was to be set off by compensation the victim
received from an insurance payment or in a future civil suit. If the
64. See Pub. L. No. 97-291 §§ 2-9, 96 Stat. 1248-58 (1982).
65. Id. § 2, 96 Stat. at 1249.
66. Id. § 3, 96 Stat. at 1249. The harm included "any harm, including financial,
social, psychological, and physical ... ." Id. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying
text for the discussion on the Task Force on Crime.
67. See id. § 5, 96 Stat. at 1255.
68. See id. § 5, 96 Stat. at 1253 (renumbered, amended, and currently codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)). Additionally, a court could impose a restitution order for
crimes dealing with air piracy. Id. Title 18 of the United States Code is entitled
"Crimes and Criminal Procedure."
69. See id.
70. Id., 96 Stat. at 1255.
71. See id., 96 Stat. at 1253-54.
72. Id., 96 Stat. at 1254. If the victim received outside compensation, such as an
insurance payment, the court was encouraged to order the offender to pay the outside
source in an equivalent amount. Id. This would not only ensure that the victim did
not receive double compensation, but also that the offender did not receive a benefit
by paying a smaller restitution amount. See also S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 32 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2538.
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court ordered no restitution, or only a partial order, it was required to
state on the record its reasons for doing so.73
The original VWPA also stated that any conflict between the
parties as to the quantity or type of restitution to be ordered was to be
determined by the court using a preponderance of the evidence
standard. 4 If a court placed a defendant on probation, or if the
defendant was paroled, the restitution order was mandated to be a
condition of either circumstance. Either the federal government or a
person named as a victim in the order was allowed to enforce the
order "in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action. 7 6
The legislative history of the VWPA noted that the "insensitivity
and lack of concern for the victim" was a "tragic failing in [the]
criminal justice system. ' 77 When discussing the need for restitution,
the Senate Report on the VWPA stated the following:
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every
formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It
holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to
punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure that the wrongdoer is
required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her
prior state of well-being.' s
This statement, taken by itself, shows a punitive intent for
restitution orders, as it indicates restitution should be part of
"whatever else.., society does to punish its wrongdoers."" It also
indicates how restitution can operate to make society's efforts more
focused on individual victims.
The Report lamented that the previous practice of federal criminal
courts had "reduce[ed] restitution from being an inevitable, if not
exclusive, sanction to being an occasional afterthought."8 It added
that the reason the VWPA provided various options for shaping a
restitution order was to provide the court with "flexibility in
determining the kind of restitution which would both satisfy the victim
and provide maximum rehabilitative incentives to the offender."81
The above statements from the legislative history show that Congress
73. See § 5, 96 Stat. at 1253.
74. Id., 96 Stat. at 1255. This provision, originally at 18 U.S.C. § 3580, has
survived intact with the exact same language in its current form at 18 U.S.C.A. §
3664(e) (2004). See discussion infra Part II.D regarding this evidence standard in the
context of the potential violation by the VWPA and MVRA of the Sixth
Amendment.
75. See § 5, 96 Stat. at 1255. Failure to pay restitution could lead to a revocation
of either probation or parole. Id.
76. Id.
77. S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 10.
78. Id. at 30.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 32.
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was aware of the punitive past of restitution. The statements support
the notion that Congress had both offender punishment and victim
compensation in mind when enacting the VWPA. They also point to
the idea of restitution orders having the concurrent result of
personalizing the impact of the crime on both the defendant and the
victim.
The VWPA has been amended several times since its inception.1
2
Two significant clauses were inserted in 1990, one of which defined a
fraud victim for restitution purposes: "[A] victim of an offense that
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal
activity means any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern."83 The
second change allowed a judge to order restitution beyond the scope
of the victim's loss if the defendant agreed to do so in a plea
agreement. 84  Both of these amendments served to significantly
expand the class of victims for whom restitution could be ordered.
The expansion of the restitution remedy to a larger class of victims
does not by itself favor defining restitution as either criminal or civil.
It could be viewed either as a punitive measure, in that Congress was
interested in having a greater number of defendants pay a restitution
penalty, or it could just as easily be interpreted as a victim-oriented
statutory change not concerned with any penal effects. Other
pertinent statutory amendments will be addressed in the following
paragraphs, which discuss the language and passage of the MVRA.
On April 24, 1996, Congress passed the MVRA,85 which mandated
restitution for a swath of federal crimes.8 6 The Senate Report on the
MVRA noted that while the direct, economic costs to the victims of
crime were "staggering," the real cost, encompassing the emotional
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000) (noting multiple amendments from 1984 through
2000).
83. See The Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2509, 104 Stat.
4863.
84. Id. The plea agreement clause is exceptionally important. According to
federal criminal statistics for the year 2002 from the Department of Justice, 89% of all
criminal cases resulted in convictions. An astounding 96% of those convictions in the
federal justice system resulted from defendants pleading guilty. Only 4% of the
convictions came from trial verdicts. See The Dep't of Justice Statistics, Federal
Justice Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm (last visited Mar.
20, 2005); see also infra Part III.C (noting the implications of the high percentage of
plea agreements on the Sixth Amendment argument about the restitution statutes).
85. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204, 110 Stat. 1227 (1996) (codified and amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3663A).
86. Congress first imposed mandatory restitution in 1994 for victims of sex crimes,
child abuse, domestic violence, and stalking. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40113(a)(1),
108 Stat. 1904 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2248); id. § 40113(b)(1), 108
Stat. at 1907 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2259); id. § 40221(a), 108 Stat. at




and other intangible effects of crime, was "incalculable."87 Although
the nation had made "significant strides.., toward a more victim-
centered justice system," restitution still required more attention.88
Under a purely discretionary restitution regime, federal judges had
imposed restitution in only 20.2% of all criminal cases;89 the only
crime for which judges ordered restitution in a majority of the
circumstances was robbery, at 55.2%.90
The House of Representatives passed the MVRA unanimously in a
form that required mandatory restitution for all federal criminal
convictions.9" While the Senate was supportive of mandatory
restitution, it was concerned with the amount of additional work the
House version would require of the federal judiciary by compelling
the courts to impose restitution on every federal criminal defendant.92
Thus, the final version of the MVRA restricted mandatory restitution
orders only to "identifiable... victims [who had] suffered a physical
injury or pecuniary loss"9 3 from a "crime of violence," an "offense
against property ... including any offense committed by fraud or
deceit," or an offense related to tampering with consumer products.94
Besides making restitution mandatory in these instances, the other
goals of the legislation were the establishment of one unified process
for the imposition of mandatory restitution, and the alignment of the
procedural rules for the collection of restitution orders with those for
collecting fines.95
With regard to the purpose of mandatory restitution, the legislative
report contained several statements that are illustrative of the dual
interests of Congress in passing the MVRA. In its purpose section, the
report stated that
[t]his legislation is needed to ensure the loss to crime victims is
recognized, and that they receive the restitution that they are due. It
is also necessary to ensure that the offender realizes the damage
87. See S. Rep No. 104-179, at 17 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 930.




92. Id. at 18 (stating that the Senate committee was "not unmindful of the costs to
the justice system of this legislation").
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B) (2000).
94. Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A).
95. See S. Rep No. 104-179, at 12-14. There is no dispute among federal judges
that a fine, which is paid to the state and not the victim, is a criminal punishment. See
United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a fine is
"traditionally a criminal remedy"); see also infra Part III.D (advocating that
restitution orders for government victims should be equated to fines).
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caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as well as
to society.96
Additional language in the report's discussion section echoed the
same thought, maintaining that the "essence of the committee's intent
in favorably reporting"97 on the House version of the bill was that it
was "essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact
that crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, ensure that
[sic] offender be held accountable to repay these costs." 98
The discussion section of the report noted testimony from the
Federal Judicial Conference that eighty-five percent of federal
offenders were "indigent at the time of sentencing," and that
therefore mandatory restitution would not really lead to any increased
benefits for victims.99 In response to this information, the Report
asserted that "this position underestimates the benefits that even
nominal restitution payments have for the victim of crime, as well as
the potential penalogical benefits of requiring the offender to be
accountable for the harm caused to the victim."'00  The Report
referred at least twice to restitution as an "integral part"'0 ' of the
criminal sentencing process. Thus, even if defendants were indigent
or imprisoned, and therefore unable to make any real payments to
their victims, "these factors [did] not obviate the victim's right to
restitution or the need that defendants be ordered to pay
restitution.""1 2 This is yet another suggestion that Congress had more
than just a compensatory goal in mind for restitution orders.
At the same time the MVRA was passed, Congress made significant
alterations to 18 U.S.C. § 3664,03 the enforcement mechanism for
restitution orders for both the VWPA 1 4 and MVRA.1°5 Where § 3664
previously required judges to take the defendant's financial status into
account in deciding the quantity of restitution, and whether to impose
it at all,10 6 it now directs the court to impose restitution "in the full
amount of each victim's losses.., and without consideration of the
economic circumstances of the defendant."'0 7 The court is now only
96. See S. Rep No. 104-179, at 12. This statement provides additional support for
the argument that restitution serves a punishment goal that makes victims feel that
society is concerned about them individually in its fight against crime.




101. Id. at 20, 21.
102. Id. at 21.
103. See The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
206(a), 110 Stat. 1232 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664 (2004)).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d) (2000).
105. See id. § 3663A(d).
106. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A). Several circuit courts have relied on the fact that
the statute no longer allows consideration of a defendant's financial status in crafting
2726 [Vol. 73
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allowed to consider the fiscal status of the defendant when deciding
on a restitution payment schedule." 8 Even if a defendant has no
ability to pay, currently or in the foreseeable future, the court can
choose to impose nominal restitution payments.10 9
Another noteworthy change brought about by Congress's
amendments to § 3664 was a change to the option of the victim to
pursue the restitution order on his own. Prior to April 23, 1996, the
VWPA allowed both the federal government and the individual victim
to enforce the order of restitution "in the same manner as a judgment
in a civil action.""' In the current version of § 3664, the power to
enforce the restitution order lies solely with the government."'
However, a victim named in the restitution order may still use the
judgment to get a lien on the defendant's property." 2
Congress also amended the VWPA to expand the definition of a
victim" 3 to mirror the definition it wrote into the MVRA;" 4  the
provision defines a victim as any "person directly and proximately
harmed as a result... of an offense," and includes the previous
the quantity of a restitution order as evidence that restitution imposed pursuant to the
MVRA increases a defendant's criminal punishment. See, e.g., infra notes 217-23. But
see 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (where the VWPA seems to allow the court to
consider the economic situation of the defendant when deciding to order restitution).
108. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C), (3)(A).
109. Id. § 3664(f)(3)(B).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1994) (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)).
111. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664 (m)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Phillips, No.
CR.A. 97-68-B, 2001 WL 34046433, at *2 (M.D. La. July 3, 2001) ("The 1996
amendments [to the VWPA] removed the discretion of the victim to enforce the
restitution order. Enforcement... now rests exclusively with the United States.").
112. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(m)(B).
113. All federal courts have interpreted the victim definition in the VWPA and
MVRA expansively to include governmental and other nonhuman entities. This is an
important factor for the secondary alternative that is proposed in Part III in lieu of
interpreting all restitution orders as criminal. See United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d
40, 42-44 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the U.S. Government fit the definition of a
victim under the MVRA); United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir.
2004) (upholding an MVRA restitution order for the benefit of the Social Security
Administration); United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the State of Mississippi was a victim of defendant's mail fraud scheme);
United States v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming a restitution
order to the United States Post Office); United States v. Martin, 128 F.3d 1188, 1190-
92 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Illinois Department of Public Aid was a victim,
and collecting numerous cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits); United States v. Campbell, 848 F.2d 846, 855 (8th Cir. 1988)
(upholding a restitution order payable to the city of Kansas City, Missouri); United
States v. Ruffen, 780 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a county was a
victim and could receive restitution and that "[flurthermore, since the government
'stands in the shoes' of the taxpayers, there are human victims of this crime-
taxpayers-who were defrauded out of revenue which they had paid to the
government"(citation omitted)).
114. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (B)(2), with id. § 3663A(a)(2). The provisions are
identical.
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language relating to fraudulent or conspiratorial activity.' 15
Furthermore, Congress inserted an entirely new section into the
VWPA, allowing courts to impose restitution orders on defendants
convicted of certain drug offenses, even when there is no identifiable
victim of the crime."6 The restitution ordered in this type of case,
referred to in the statute as "community restitution,"'1 7 is to be split
between state agencies that manage crime victim assistance and
substance abuse programs." 8 A restitution payment made to a state
agency has many similarities to a criminal fine payment, which is also
made to the government.
Lastly, Congress strengthened the enforcement of restitution orders
under the VWPA and MVRA by adding a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3613A,
and amending another, 18 U.S.C. § 3614, in the subchapter of Title 18
concerned with the post-sentence administration of fines."9 Section
3613A allows the court, upon finding that a defendant is in default on
a fine or restitution order, to authorize various actions, including
revocation of probation and parole, to "obtain compliance" with the
order.120 Section 3614 allows the court to reimpose a prison sentence
on a defendant who "knowingly fails to pay" 121 an overdue restitution
order in the same manner as an overdue fine.122 Equating the
enforcement of restitution orders with that of fines, a traditional
criminal remedy, would suggest an understanding of restitution as at
least partially penal in nature.
Restitution in federal sentencing is therefore not settled as either a
criminal or civil doctrine. The above analysis of the VWPA and
MVRA shows that the legislative history contains evidence of both
penal and compensatory aims. It also shows how the payment of
restitution from the criminal to the victim achieves both of those goals
in a singular, focused, act between the two parties. 123
115. Id. § 3663(a)(2); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(1)-(7).
117. Id. § 3663(c)(6).
118. Id. § 3663(c)(3)(A)-(B). See infra discussion Part III arguing that community
restitution, in which there is no identifiable victim, and the money is paid directly to
the state, is no different in substance from a criminal fine.
119. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(o) (2004).
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(1).
121. See id. § 3614(a).
122. Recall that a fine undeniably acts as criminal punishment. See supra note 95.
123. See 141 Cong. Rec. S38,451 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). Senator Hatch stated
that
[r]estitution ... can provide important closure to victims of crime....
Many crime victims have told me that until the criminal is directed to pay
restitution, the wound of the crime is not completely healed.
Restitution has an important penalogical function as well, providing a
necessary reminder to the offender of the human consequences of his or her
criminl [sic] act.... [E]ven if only a few dollars a month are collectd [sic], it




D. The Supreme Court Discussion of Restitution as Part of Criminal
Sentencing
Although the Supreme Court has not had the occasion to decide
whether restitution specifically authorized by the VWPA and MVRA
is criminal or civil, it has dealt with restitution in the criminal
sentencing process a number of times. In Kelly v. Robinson,'24 the
Court reversed a Second Circuit decision and held that restitution
orders imposed as part of a "criminal judgment" were not
dischargeable in the same manner as personal debts in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding. 25 The decision referred to restitution as "an
effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to
confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused."'2 6 The
Court found that it was the specific connection between the harm
caused and the amount of the restitution ordered that gave restitution
a "more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine.'
27
An additional factor the Kelly Court focused on that supported
their view of restitution as penal in nature was the placement of
restitution within a state criminal sentencing proceeding. The Court
stated that criminal proceedings focus on the "State's interests in
rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for
compensation.' ' 2  The Court found it relevant to the definition of
restitution as criminal punishment that a victim did not control the
amount of restitution, or the decision whether to impose it, and that
the decision "generally [did] not turn on the victim's injury.' 1 29
In a footnote, the decision in Kelly referred to the VWPA as
another context in which courts had been compelled to decide
whether restitution orders were compensatory or penal.13  A
Id. at S38,456 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Biden added the following:
[The MVRA] says to victims: You are not alone. We will demand
accountability from your wrongdoers, and we understand that criminals owe
a debt not only to society but to you. This bill also sends an important
message to criminals-you must take responsibility for our [sic] actions, and
you will pay for the pain you have caused.
Id. (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator Feinstein concluded her statement by saying
that the MVRA "will help victims, will help communities, and may well help to
rehabilitate criminals." Id. at S38,459 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Lastly, Senator
McCain ended his remarks by stating that "[the MVRAJ is an important bill which I
believe will not only assist victims but will prove to be a formidable deterrent to
crime." Id. at S38, 460 (statement of Sen. McCain).
124. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
125. Id. at 52-53.
126. Id. at 49 n.10 (citing Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A
Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 937-41 (1984)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 53.
129. Id. at 52.
130. Id. at 53 n. 14. (discussing how all federal circuit courts had held that having a
judge impose restitution as part of a criminal sentence did not violate the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial for common law matters).
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reasonable interpretation of the context of the footnote is that
restitution authorized by the VWPA would be considered penal as
well. However, recall that Kelly was decided in 1986, when the
decision to award restitution under the VWPA, and the size of the
order, were still completely within a federal judge's power."' The
current version of the VWPA constrains the discretion of courts to
impose restitution by requiring mandatory restitution for certain
crimes, and by the requirement that federal courts must impose the
total amount of restitution without regard to the financial status of the
defendant.132 Some federal courts have seized on the difference in
statutory language as an indication that the language in Kelly
identifying restitution orders as universally penal is not applicable to
restitution orders imposed under the MVRA.'33
The Court seemed to limit Kelly's holding, even though the decision
claimed not to do so, when it ruled in Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare v. Davenport13 4 that the exception to discharge for
penal restitution orders did not apply to certain Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceedings.'35 Davenport was distinguished from the
Kelly holding because the Court interpreted Congress's intent in
crafting the statutory language for bankruptcies under Chapter 13 to
allow the discharge of restitution orders.'36 In an immediate response
to Davenport, Congress made all restitution imposed as part of a
criminal sentence non-dischargeable in all bankruptcy proceedings,
regardless of what chapter of the bankruptcy code was used to file for
bankruptcy.137  In the legislative history from the House of
Representatives, Congress equated criminal restitution with fines. 3 '
131. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text; see also Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53
(noting that the state restitution statute in question was a "flexible remedy tailored to
the defendant's situation," and did not "require imposition of restitution in the
amount of the harm caused").
133. See, e.g., United States v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1322 (D. Utah 2004)
(contrasting the MVRA which mandates full restitution with the state statute in Kelly
that allowed judges more leeway in deciding on the size of a restitution order).
134. 495 U.S. 552, 563-64 (1990) ("Our refusal to carve out a broad judicial
exception to discharge for restitution orders does not signal a retreat from the
principles applied in Kelly."), partially overruled by Criminal Victims Protection Act
of 1990, Pub. L. 101-581, § 3,104 Stat. 2865.
135. Id. at 555.
136. Id. at 563-64.
137. See § 3, 104 Stat. at 2865; S. Rep. No. 101-434, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4065, 4071 (overruling Davenport). Congress added an additional
protection against discharge of restitution orders in 1994. See Pub L. No. 103-322, §
320934, 108 Stat. 2135 (1994) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13) (2000))
(exempting from discharge any order of restitution ordered under Title 18 of the U.S.
Code for bankruptcies under Sections 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code).
138. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-681(I), at 181 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6472, 6587 (referring to the inability to discharge debts in bankruptcy proceedings,
including debts "in the nature of a fine, forfeiture, or criminal restitution obligation").
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This congressional action to eliminate criminal restitution from any
debt discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding could be used by a person
on either side of the civil-criminal debate on restitution orders. A
person who sees restitution as civil could use Congress's actions to
indicate that Congress was concerned with protecting the rights of
victims to be made whole by monetary compensation. A person who
sees restitution as criminal could use this statutory change as evidence
of Congress's interest in preventing felons from escaping financial
obligations of their criminal sentence by declaring bankruptcy.
In 1990, the Court addressed the reach of the VWPA in Hughey v.
United States'39 in the context of extending restitution to offenses
alleged in an indictment that were not part of the defendant's
admitted offenses in a plea agreement. The Court held that
Congressional intent as determined by the "language and structure"'4 °
of the VWPA was to limit restitution orders only to the "specific
conduct that [was] the basis of the offense of conviction."'' The
possibility that a victim might receive less than a complete recovery
because of a plea agreement that did not include all potential charges
was an unavoidable side effect of a calculated decision made by the
prosecution and defense to "avoid potential losses."'42 According to
the Court, Congress did not show any intent to shield a crime victim
from a plea agreement.143 Congress again responded to the Court's
interpretation by amending the VWPA to include expanded language
about victims and plea agreements.'"
The Court has not had the opportunity since Kelly to consider the
nature of restitution in criminal sentencing. Although the Court's
analysis of restitution in criminal proceedings has been limited, it has
written widely and extensively on statutory interpretation. Part I.E
briefly outlines the test the Court has used to help determine if an
ambiguous statute is criminal or civil in nature.
139. 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
140. Id. at 413.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 421.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The MVRA contains the same
language regarding plea agreements and victims. See supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text. This language has led to some tension regarding its use by federal
courts. See Catharine M. Goodwin, Grid & Bear It, Champion, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 37.
Federal courts have used the expanded victim definition and conspiracy language to,
among other things, award restitution to victims not named in the indictment, for acts
that the defendant was not convicted for, and for acts that occurred beyond the
statute of limitations. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1337-43
(11th Cir. 2004) (collecting and discussing cases, and holding that the MVRA requires
restitution to victims for the defendant's conduct that occurred beyond the statute of
limitations). See infra Part II.D regarding the possible Sixth Amendment violation of
these decisions.
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E. The Supreme Court Test to Determine the Civil or Criminal Nature
of Ambiguous Statutes
Deciding whether a statute is criminal or civil in nature is critical,
because many constitutional protections only apply to criminal
situations.'45 The foundational case for the modern court test-which
sets out a general structure for making such determinations-is
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.'46 Mendoza-Martinez stated that a
court must first determine the congressional intent behind the statute
before proceeding to interpret the statute itself. 47 If intent could not
be ascertained, Mendoza-Martinez, relying on many older cases,'48
listed seven factors that the Court used in the past to interpret
ambiguous statutes:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the
inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. 49
The two-prong analysis that the Court elucidated in Mendoza-
Martinez to decide a civil/criminal penalty has been approved of as a
"useful framework"' 10 many times since, and for different types of
cases.151  Although the factors were originally used in analyzing
statutes for double jeopardy violations, they apply to a number of
constitutional provisions, including the Ex Post Facto Clause.
152
145. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (listing the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause and Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Sixth
Amendment as examples of constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants);
see also infra Part II.A (discussing the Ex-Post Facto Clause).
146. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
147. See id. at 169 ("Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the
penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on
its face.").
148. See id. at 168-70 nn.22-30.
149. Id. at 168-69.
150. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
151. See, e.g., id. at 105-06 (registration of convicted sex offenders under the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997) (monetary penalty imposed by the Office of
Comptroller of Currency did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (civil commitment of a sex offender did not
violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses); United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 253-55 (1980) (proceedings under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
did not violate the Fifth Amendment).
152. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97.
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The Court first looks to the legislative intent of the statute as "'a
question of statutory construction,' 1 5 3  because "considerable
deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated
it.,, 54 If the intent is determined to be the imposition of punishment,
there is no need for any further discussion. 55  If the intent is
determined to be civil, then the Court looks to whether the "statutory
scheme [is] so punitive.., as to negate that intention."'56 Only "'the
clearest proof"" 7 is considered dispositive to overturn a civil
classification of a penalty, because the Court "ordinarily defer[s] to
the legislature's stated intent."' 58
The Court looks to the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors 59 to help
with this analysis, 160 but the factors are "'neither exhaustive nor
dispositive,"' 6 and often conflict with each other.'62 The civil-
criminal test has generally been applied by the Court to civil statutes
that were challenged as being so punitive in nature as to really be
criminal.'63 Arguably, the test seems ill-suited to federal restitution,
which the legislative history of the MVRA refers to as a fundamental
component of the criminal sentence."6 Perhaps this is why only one
federal circuit court has used the test to determine whether restitution
authorized by the MVRA is civil or criminal. 65
153. Id. at 92 (citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361); see also
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
154. Doe, 538 U.S. at 93.
155. Id. at 92-93.
156. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. At least one commentator has strongly criticized the
Court's increasing deference to legislative labeling of sanctions as civil penalties that
really serve penal purposes so as to avoid the application of criminal constitutional
protections. See Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 679, 698-99 (1999) ("The fact is, however, that the Court is no longer
trying to define punishment.... but is instead giving the government free reign to
circumvent constitutional criminal procedure altogether."). Professor Klein also
disapproves of actions by Congress to impose victims' rights (such as restitution) into
criminal proceedings that are purportedly about harm to society and not harm to
individual people. Id. at 688-89. Both of these activities serve to blur the line between
civil and criminal proceedings and reduce the rights of defendants. Id. at 686-88.
157. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
158. Id.
159. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
160. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97.
161. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
162. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 151.
164. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text; see also Klein, supra note 156,
at 719-20 (claiming that any test will ultimately fail when it is applied to "hybrid"
statutes that have dual motives).
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F. The Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth
Amendment
1. The Ex Post Facto Clause
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution simply states
that "no ex post facto Law shall be passed" by the federal
government. 6 6 In an early decision, Calder v. Bull,167 the Supreme
Court held that the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause was simply
that a law should not be passed after the fact, and that this prohibition
"necessarily require[d] some explanation.""16 Using Blackstone, the
Federalist Papers, and several state constitutions for precedential
support, the Court determined that the scope of the clause extended
only to state laws that retroactively increased the punishment for a
criminal act.'69
The Calder decision listed four types of criminal statutes that if
passed would be illegal under the Clause:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to
convict the offender.170
This analysis of the applicable range of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
made just twelve years after the passage of the Constitution, has
survived essentially unchanged to this day."'1  The consistent
interpretation that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to statutes
that increase criminal, not civil, penalties has made it a useful context
for federal courts to determine if restitution is a punitive or
compensatory measure.'72
166. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A second clause in the Constitution also prohibits
states from passing ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 6.
167. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
168. Id. at 390.
169. Id. at 391 ("But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition,
that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law; but only those that create, or aggravate,
the crime; or encrease [sic] the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the
purpose of conviction.").
170. Id. at 390.
171. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611 (2003) (acknowledging the
"authoritative account of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause" as set forth in
Calder).




2. The Abatement Doctrine
The modern statement of the rule of abatement stems from the
Supreme Court case Durham v. United States, which held that
"death pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates not only
the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its
inception." '174 The defendant in Durham died after filing a petition for
a writ of certiorari; the Court granted the defendant's writ, vacated
the judgment of the Ninth Circuit affirming his conviction, and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
case.
175
In Dove v. United States,176 the Court backed away from its Durham
holding and adopted the reasoning of Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion in Durham.17 7  In a concise opinion, the Court denied a
petition for certiorari when the appellant died before the petition was
heard, but did not dismiss the entire conviction. 78  The Court
overruled Durham "to the extent that [it was] inconsistent" with
Dove. 179
The federal courts of appeal all followed the lead of the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Moehlenkamp,8 ° which concluded that the
Dove holding did not change the abatement doctrine, but merely
declined to extend its application to a defendant who had received
final appellate review of his case, but died while a petition for
certiorari was pending."' A dismissal of a certiorari petition by the
Supreme Court did not discriminate against a deceased criminal
defendant, for he had already received appellate review of his case; a
defendant so positioned would not have his conviction nullified.'82 In
comparison, "fairness" and "justice" required that a criminal
defendant who died while his direct appeal was pending "not stand
173. 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam), partially overruled by Dove v. United
States, 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (per curiam); see also List v. Pennsylvania, 131 U.S.
396 (1888) (an early example of the abatement doctrine).
174. Durham, 401 U.S. at 483.
175. Id.
176. 423 U.S. at 325.
177. Durham, 401 U.S. at 483, 484-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
grant of the writ and dismissal of the case would incorrectly erase a conviction that
had received a thorough review by an appeals court, whereas a denial of the petition
would let the appealed judgment stand).
178. Dove, 423 U.S. at 325.
179. Id.
180. 557 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1977).
181. Id. at 127-28. "[T]he Court's cryptic statement in Dove was [not] meant to
alter the longstanding and unanimous view of the lower federal courts that the death
of an appellant during the pendency of his appeal of right from a criminal conviction





convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal.' 8 3  A
defendant whose appeal was pending in the latter situation would
have both his conviction vacated and his indictment dismissed.'84 This
is the current unanimous view of the scope of the abatement doctrine
in all the federal circuits.'85
3. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment provides, among other protections, a
fundamental right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. 18 6 The
significance of this protection can be gleaned from its historical
recognition as an unassailable right dating back at least to the signing
of the Magna Carta in the year 1215.187 Thomas Jefferson wrote about
the English king's abuse of the jury right in the Declaration of
Independence as one of the justifications for the American revolt
against the British.'88 The right to a jury trial provides an "inestimable
safeguard" for a criminal defendant against a "corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against [a] compliant, biased, or eccentric judge," and
applies to all non-serious offenses at the federal and state level.189 The
fundamental nature of this protection from government oppression in
the criminal arena played a vital role in the founding of the United
States, and the Supreme Court continues to acknowledge its critical
importance in the modern era.19°
The history of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the abatement doctrine,
and the Sixth Amendment mentioned above provides a helpful
framework within which the nature of restitution can be further
explored.' 9' Part II proceeds to outline how a consistent classification
of restitution has eluded the federal circuits, at both the inter-circuit
level and within some circuits as well.'92 Part II discusses the three
areas of the law summarized above and how they are affected by the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) (adopting
the basic function of abatement and acknowledging the unanimous acceptance of the
doctrine, with the exception of restitution orders, by the other courts of appeal); infra
Part II.B (discussing the application of the abatement doctrine to restitution orders).
186. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
187. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968) (detailing the
fundamental right to a jury trial in the criminal context and the historical record of its
origin in common-law England).
188. Id. at 152.
189. Id. at 156. The Supreme Court has limited the coverage of this right to have a
jury hear a criminal case to serious offenses only; crimes that carry a jail term of six
months or less generally do not qualify for this safeguard. Id. at 159 ("Crimes carrying
possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify
as petty offenses." (citations omitted)).
190. See infra notes 327-34 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
192. See infra Parts II.A-D.
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determination of whether restitution orders are criminal or civil in
nature. Part II demonstrates that the lack of a coherent
categorization of restitution as either a civil or criminal remedy has
left the circuits in conflict with each other in an expanding set of
circumstances. The attendant result of the overall conflict is that
defendants facing similar restitution orders in different circuits will be
treated differently depending on where their case is heard.
II. THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DEFINITION OF FEDERAL RESTITUTION
CAUSES CIRCUIT DISPUTES AND PLAYS A ROLE IN A NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE VWPA AND MVRA
In the ex post facto and abatement contexts, the courts are divided
on how the constitutional and jurisprudential protections granted to
criminal defendants are applied when restitution orders are involved.
Although the courts are not divided in the Sixth Amendment context,
the definition of restitution as a punitive or compensatory measure
has significantly affected the courts' analysis of this newest legal
challenge to the use of the restitution statutes. A deeper look at each
of these areas shows the importance of reaching a consensus on
whether restitution is a criminal or civil remedy, because of the impact
of a restitution order imposed as part of a criminal sentence on a
defendant may vary significantly simply because of a geographic detail
of where the crime was committed.
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Retroactive Application of the
VWPA and MVRA
The Ex Post Facto Clause prevents retroactive application of a
statute to a defendant's criminal conduct that increases the
defendant's criminal punishment.193 In the first few years after the
VWPA became law, there was little discussion in the federal courts
about the ex post facto implications of the statute. A circuit split
developed, however, over the issue of imposing restitution on
defendants for criminal activities that commenced before the passage
of the VWPA, but concluded after its adoption.194 The Second, Ninth,
193. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
194. Compare United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding
that restitution ordered under the VWPA could only be applied to acts that occurred
after the effective start date of the statute), United States v. Oldaker, 823 F.2d 778,
781 (4th Cir. 1987) (same), United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.
1986) (same), and United States v. Forzese, 756 F.2d 217, 222 (1st Cir. 1985) (same),
with United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 42 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that the
VWPA allowed restitution for a defendant convicted of criminal racketeering acts
which began before the start date of the VWPA), United States v. Angelica, 859 F.2d
1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (VWPA could be applied to fraudulent activity that
started before and ended after the start date of the VWPA), United States v. Purther,
823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1987) (same), and United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558,
1570-71 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
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Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits believed that the VWPA could be
applied in this context, while the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
believed that it could not.195
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Corn, 196 was the only circuit
that mentioned the Ex Post Facto Clause in its analysis. Corn
concluded that because the VWPA authorized federal judges to
impose restitution separately and independently of a probation order,
it increased punishment, and therefore could not be applied
retroactively without violating the ex post facto prohibition.197 No
other case that considered the applicability of the VWPA to ongoing
fraudulent activity discussed the Ex Post Facto Clause.'98
Discretionary restitution was accepted as simply another facet of the
criminal sentencing process and, therefore, penal in nature.'99
The federal circuits had another opportunity to address whether
restitution imposed pursuant to the VWPA created an ex post facto
problem when Congress amended the VWPA as part of the Crime
Control Act of 19 9 0.200 In United States v. Jewett,2 11 the Sixth Circuit
held that applying the expanded definition of a victim from the
recently amended VWPA to a defendant's restitution order for a
crime that was committed prior to the amendment would violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause.02 In a footnote, the Jewett court referred to the
legislative history of the amendments to support its holding.2 3 The
analysis of the amendments to the VWPA was in a subsection of the
legislative history entitled "Enhanced Criminal Penalties, ' '2°4 thus
supporting the Jewett opinion that restitution was a criminal
punishment.
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in United States v.
Streebing,2°5 and the Fifth, Eleventh, and First Circuits soon
followed.20 6 In 1992, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Snider,27
195. See supra note 192.
196. 836 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1988).
197. Id. at 895-96.
198. The Bortnovsky case mentioned Corn's ex post facto analysis, but provided no
opinion of its own. See Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d at 42.
199. See, e.g., id. at 42 ("The [VWPA] provides for restitution as a part of
sentencing for an offense."); Angelica, 859 F.2d at 1393 ("The legislative history of the
VWPA demonstrates that it was meant to fill the sentencing gap left by [the Federal
Probation Act], which contains no restitution provision apart from probation.");
Martin, 788 F.2d at 189 n.6 (restitution under the VWPA is part of the sentence for
conviction).
200. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
201. 978 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1992).
202. Id. at 252-53.
203. Id. at 253 n.5.
204. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-681(I), at 172, 177 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6578, 6583.
205. 987 F.2d 368, 376 (6th Cir. 1993).
206. See United States v. Gilberg, 75 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1996) (referring to the
Jewett holding); United States v. Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304, 1314 (11th Cir. 1995) (referring
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held that the language from the 1990 amendment to the VWPA that
would allow a court to impose restitution for any crime pursuant to a
plea agreement could not be applied retroactively to a defendant who
pled guilty almost a year before the amendment.2 °8 In Snider, the
statute that the defendant admitted to violating was not one for which
the less expansive pre-1990 amendment VWPA allowed judges to
impose restitution;20 9 applying the amended plea agreement language
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.210 The Snider court avowed
that although restitution served some of the same purposes as a civil
remedy, it fulfilled the customary goals of punishment-deterrence of
future acts, society's interest in achieving nonviolent retribution, and
offender rehabilitation.211
While the VWPA received little ex post facto analysis, every circuit
but the Fourth ruled on the issue of the Ex Post Facto Clause and
retroactive application of the MVRA within a few years of its
enactment.
212
1. The Majority View
The majority of circuit courts hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause
prevents retroactive application of the MVRA to defendants whose
crimes occurred before the MVRA took effect, but were sentenced
after it was enacted.2 13  The Second Circuit, in United States v.
to the Streebing case); United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 929 n.19 (5th Cir. 1993)
(referring to the Jewett holding).
207. 957 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1992).
208. Id. at 706.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 706 n.2.
211. Id. at 707 (citations omitted).
212. See United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 419 n.19 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting the
split in the circuits over the Ex Post Facto Clause and stating that the Fourth Circuit
had not yet ruled on the issue). There is conflicting discussion of the ex post facto
circuit split. Compare Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act's Challenge to The Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1013,
1018 (2001) (concluding that Congress intended the MVRA to be a civil statute with
only an ancillary punitive effect), with Irene J. Chase, Comment, Making the Criminal
Pay in Cash: The Ex Post Facto Implications of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 463, 489 (2001) (advocating that applying the
constitutional avoidance doctrine to the MVRA leads to the conclusion that it should
be interpreted as a criminal statute).
213. The Department of Justice agrees with the majority view, namely that
restitution orders act as criminal punishment for the offender and cannot be applied
retroactively under the MVRA. See Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines
for Victim and Witness Assistance 2000, at art. V, § B, available at
http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/publications/infores/agg2000/html/aS.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2005). The guidelines state:
The Department of Justice has taken the position that any provision of the
MVRA regarding the decision to impose restitution or the amount of the
obligation must apply prospectively,... [as] the Ex Post Facto Clause
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Thompson,2 4 was the first to state that position, but did so with
essentially no analysis.2"5 The D.C. Circuit also dealt with the Ex Post
Facto Clause in a perfunctory manner in United States v. Bapack,
citing to the Thompson decision for its own conclusion that the
MVRA could not be applied retroactively.
216
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Baggett,27 decided that the
MVRA increased punishment in such a manner that it could not be
used retrospectively as a statutory basis for a restitution order. The
Baggett court found that the MVRA required full restitution without
consideration of the defendant's financial status, only allowing the
court to take that status into account when setting a payment
schedule, whereas the VWPA allowed judges to take the defendant's
economic status into consideration in deciding on the amount of
restitution in the first place;"' the resulting potential increase in
restitution for the defendant would be an unconstitutional increase in
punishment.21 9
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Baggett analysis that the MVRA
increased punishment in United States v. Siegel.22° The Siegel court
also relied on its own circuit precedent from United States v. Twitty
221
for support that restitution was a criminal penalty.222 The Fifth and
Sixth Circuits have used similar logic to hold that the MVRA violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause if it is applied retroactively.223
prohibits application to offenses that were completed before [the date of
passage of the MVRA].
Id.
214. 113 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1997).
215. Id. at 15 n.1. There was no debate on the ex post facto issue, as both parties
agreed that the clause barred retroactive application of the MVRA to the defendant's
activities. Id.
216. United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1327 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
217. 125 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1997).
218. Id. at 1322.
219. Id.
220. 153 F.3d 1256, 1258-60 (11th Cir. 1998).
221. 107 F.3d 1482, 1493 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997); see also infra note 269 and
accompanying text.
222. Siegel, 153 F.3d at 1260.
223. See United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2001) (relying on
circuit precedent that restitution imposed under the VWPA was punishment, and that
the MVRA increased punishment by requiring full restitution without consideration
of the economic status of the defendant); United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 213
(5th Cir. 2000) (same). However, the Fifth Circuit holding that the MVRA violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause is in some doubt. See United States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d
548, 551 (5th Cir. 2002), where the court wrote that the "[aIppellant also argues that
applying the MVRA to criminal acts before the MVRA's effective date violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. We disagree. The MVRA merely affects how appellant's
punishment is collected; it does not increase appellant's punishment." Id. However,
the Phillips opinion can probably be limited to its facts, because the case dealt with a
procedural change in the collection of restitution, not a change in the amount of
restitution imposed the defendant. Id. (citing Creel v. Kyle, 42 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir.
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The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Williams,224 used a different
path to reach the same conclusion that a restitution order under the
MVRA was punishment for ex post facto purposes. It concluded that
the "plain meaning 22 5 of the MVRA statute that required restitution
"in addition to ... any other penalty authorized by law "226 meant that
restitution imposed as part of the sentencing process was punishment.
The Williams court was able to distinguish an earlier case, United
States v. Crawford,227 where the Eighth Circuit held in the context of
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA") that restitution
was not punishment for ex post facto purposes. The Williams court
found that because the CSRA's statutory restitution requirement was
not contained in its statutory subsection labeled "punishment,, 228 it
was not punishment and could therefore be applied retroactively.
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Edwards, 9 provided the most
in-depth analysis of the view that retroactive application of the
MVRA was unconstitutional. The Edwards court relied on several
grounds for its holding. First, it decided that the statutory scheme of
placing the restitution order within the sentencing process, and as an
available condition of probation, indicated that restitution was a form
of punishment.23 ' Next, the court looked to the legislative history of
1995) (citing for the premise that statutory procedural changes that work against a
criminal defendant do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
224. 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997).
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting the MVRA statute) (quotations omitted). By itself, the use of the
word "penalty" does not necessarily imply an exclusively criminal remedy. See, e.g.,
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (stating that "[e]ven in those cases
where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty" (quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
227. 115 F.3d 1397, 1402-03 (8th Cir. 1997). Crawford held that restitution was not
punishment, but that the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 ("CSRA") requires
that a person convicted of failing to pay child support under the statute would not
only face imprisonment and a fine, but also be required to pay restitution in the
amount of unpaid child support previously owed. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), (c)-(d)
(2000). Past-due support was defined as any child support previously determined by a
court order or an equivalent administrative order. See id. § 228(f)(3). The CSRA
merely referred to the VWPA (the current version of the CSRA refers to the
MVRA) as a means of enforcing a payment, which the defendant had already been
obligated by a court to pay. As the Crawford court said, "even if we were to assume
that the restitution order is punishment within the meaning of the ex post facto clause,
Crawford is not being punished for acts that were innocent at the time they were
committed, ... nor is the punishment greater than that which was authorized" when
the defendant committed the crime. Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1403. As a result, it is
possible to make a distinction between restitution orders pursuant to the CSRA, and
those restitution orders ordered under the VWPA or MVRA for a new offense.
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(c). In the version of the statute in force at the time of the
Edwards decision, this subsection was at 18 U.S.C. § 228(b). See The Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, § 2, 106 Stat. 3403.
229. 162 F.3d 87, 89-92 (3d Cir. 1998).
230. Id. at 91.
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the MVRA 2 3 and interpreted the fact that Congress had placed
restitution in the sentencing process as a response to calls to make the
criminal justice system more sensitive to victims' needs by making the
defendant more personally responsible for his crime.232 Additionally,
the Edwards decision cited Third Circuit precedent that held in other
contexts that restitution was a type of criminal punishment.233 Lastly,
the Edwards court noted that the change in the MVRA which
required full restitution without taking into account the economic
status of the defendant had a retributive aspect.234 Therefore,
retrospective use of the MVRA violated the ex post facto
prohibition. 35
2. The Minority View
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Newman, was the first to
hold, contrary to the view of the majority of the circuits, that
retroactive mandatory restitution orders do not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.236 The Newman court admitted there was "little doubt"
that application of the MVRA to the defendant's crimes operated as a
disadvantage to the defendant, but it then engaged in an analysis of
whether restitution was in fact criminal punishment. 37 An important
distinction made in Newman between restitution and criminal
punishment was that criminal punishment was imposed on behalf of
society, while restitution payments from an individual defendant to a
specific victim were an equitable device and did not have similar
punitive effects.238 The Newman court also cited to precedent from its
own circuit and from other circuits stating that restitution was
compensatory and not penal in nature.239
Next, the Newman court applied the two-prong, seven-factor
Mendoza-Martinez240 test to the MVRA to determine its civil or
criminal nature.241  For the threshold question of determining the
intent of the VWPA and MVRA, the Newman court decided that
neither statute depicted restitution payments as either criminal or
231. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text; see also supra note 123.
232. Edwards, 162 F.3d at 91.
233. Id. at 91-92 (citing United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479-80 (3d Cir, 1985))
(finding that restitution under the VWPA was a criminal remedy and did not violate
the Seventh Amendment); see infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
234. Edwards, 162 F.3d at 92 n.6.
235. Id.
236. United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 537-42 (7th Cir. 1998).
237. Id. at 537.
238. Id. at 538.
239. Id. at 538-39.
240. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); see also supra
notes 146-58 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong, seven-factor test that
the Newman court utilized).
241. Newman, 144 F.3d at 540-42.
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civil;242 referring to a restitution order as a penalty in the statutory
language displayed no intent either way, because penalties could be
imposed in either civil or criminal contexts.243 Because it felt that the
statutory language was essentially neutral, the Newman court then put
the MVRA through the seven-factor test. It determined that six of
the seven factors leaned towards defining restitution as a civil remedy.
According to the Newman court, restitution orders: (1) did not act as
an affirmative restraint; (2) were not viewed historically as
punishment; (3) did not depend on a finding of scienter; (4) did not
promote retributive and deterrent effects; (5) had an alternative, non
criminal, compensatory purpose; and (6)were not excessive in relation
to their alternative purpose.2' The fifth of the seven Mendoza-
Martinez factors, whether the behavior which the MVRA applied to
was already a crime, was the only one that lent support to defining
restitution as a criminal penalty.245 The Newman court concluded that
restitution permitted under the VWPA and required by the MVRA
was not criminal punishment in the ex post facto context, and
therefore could be used to impose restitution on a defendant whose
criminal acts occurred before the effective date of the MVRA.246
The Tenth Circuit is the only other circuit to have joined the
Seventh in the minority view that restitution under the VWPA and
MVRA is a civil remedy. 247 In United States v. Nichols,248 the Tenth
242. Id. at 540.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 540-42; see infra notes 309-10 and accompanying text (describing
Seventh Circuit precedent that there is significant evidence that restitution has been
historically viewed as punishment).
245. Newman, 144 F.3d at 541 n.10; see infra Part II.C (criticizing the Seventh
Circuit's jurisprudence in analyzing restitution as a purely civil remedy in this
manner).
246. Newman, 144 F.3d at 542. In applying the Mendoza-Martinez test and
resolving that restitution authorized by the MVRA was non-punitive, the Newman
court made a number of questionable moves. First, it wrote that courts used the
seven-factor test "[i]f the legislature nominally designate[d] a penalty as civil or if the
label [was] ambiguous." Id. at 540. The Supreme Court, however, has really only used
these factors to analyze civil statutes that were challenged as being too punitive and
has never used it on a statute that it felt was neutral in intent. See supra notes 151, 163
and accompanying text. Next, since "[ojnly the clearest proof" will be enough to
supersede the legislative labeling of a statute as civil, see supra note 157 and
accompanying text, the seven-factor test is necessarily skewed towards interpreting
the statutory intent as a civil remedy barring some extraordinary situation. Lastly, in
stating that restitution was historically a remedial measure, not serving the traditional
punishment goals of retribution and deterrence, the Seventh Circuit neglected to
reference Judge Posner's extensive analysis of the VWPA as a criminal statute in the
Seventh Amendment context in United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 800-02 (7th
Cir. 1985), or the Supreme Court's treatment of restitution in Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 49-53 (1986), both of which specifically mentioned that restitution has
punitive and deterrent effects.
247. But see infra notes 298-300 (noting that a significant minority of the Fifth
Circuit judges agrees with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits that restitution is a civil,
non-punitive remedy).
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Circuit reversed a district court ruling that held retroactive application
of the MVRA to be an unconstitutional increase in punishment for
the defendant.249 In its conclusion that there was no ex post facto
problem with the MVRA, the Nichols court provided little analysis of
its own, relying instead on previous circuit cases that held that
restitution was designed to make victims whole, not to punish the
defendant,"' and that therefore there was no ex post facto problem
with the MVRA.
As the effective start date of the MVRA has receded into the past,
there have been fewer ex post facto challenges to either restitution
statute. However, this does not mean that this circuit split has
diminished in significance. Although Congress has not amended the
VWPA or MVRA since 2000, it might choose to do so at any time.
For example, Congress might add additional crimes to the list that
require mandatory restitution under the MVRA. If such an
amendment became a law, the federal circuits would most likely see
renewed challenges by defendants pursuant to the Ex Post Facto
Clause, and the circuit split would re-emerge. Therefore, the circuit
split as to the penal or civil nature of restitution orders still needs
resolution. Part II.B discusses another circuit split that pertains to the
abatement doctrine and restitution orders imposed as part of a
criminal sentence.
B. The Abatement Doctrine as Applied to Restitution Orders
Just as the definition by courts of restitution orders as either penal
or compensatory has caused a rift between the circuits over the
applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause,25" ' a similar disagreement
over restitution's purpose has caused a divergence of circuit opinions
over the use of the abatement doctrine to eliminate the restitution
obligations of deceased criminal appellants.252 As detailed above,253
248. 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999). The defendant in Nichols was Terry Lynn
Nichols, the co-conspirator with Timothy McVeigh in the bombing of the Oklahoma
City federal building on April 19, 1995. Id. at 1260.
249. Id. at 1278-80 (quoting a bench ruling from the district court judge).
250. Id. Nichols cited to United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996),
which considered an ex post facto challenge to a restitution order authorized pursuant
to the CSRA. Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1279; see supra note 227 (critiquing the application
of the ex post facto analysis of a restitution order under the CSRA for a past-due
court-ordered child support payment to a restitution order for an independently
committed crime). The Nichols decision also expressly accepted the Seventh Circuit
Newman view that applying the MVRA retrospectively did not conflict with the Ex
Post Facto Clause and rejected the emerging majority opinion of the other circuits.
Nichols, 169 F.3d. at 1280 n.9.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. See supra Part I.F.2 (discussing the abatement doctrine). There has been
discussion of the intersection of the abatement doctrine and criminal restitution
orders. See Joseph Sauder, Comment, How a Criminal Defendant's Death Pending
Direct Appeal Affects the Victim's Right to Restitution under the Abatement Ab Initio
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the federal courts unanimously apply the abatement doctrine to
nullify a defendant's criminal indictment and conviction when that
defendant dies awaiting a resolution of his direct appeal.
The circuit courts seemingly have had no opportunity to consider
the survival of restitution orders under the VWPA following the death
of a criminal defendant awaiting a decision on a direct appeal.
25 14
However, there is a disagreement among the circuits that have
considered the application of the abatement doctrine to restitution
orders imposed under the MVRA as part of a criminal sentence. This
division, as in the context of the ex post facto debate, stems from the
differing circuit views on whether restitution is punitive or
compensatory.
1. The Majority View
In 1984, the Fourth Circuit ruled on whether a restitution order
imposed under the VWPA abated along with the rest of a criminal
sentence in United States v. Dudley.255 The Dudley court decided that
although a restitution order authorized by the VWPA had some
punitive effects on the defendant, its main purpose was to compensate
and reduce the impact of the defendant's actions on the victims.5 6 A
restitution order did not serve the traditional objectives of
punishment - incarceration and rehabilitation - that were
accomplished by the conventional aspects of a criminal sentence.257
Doctrine, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 347,374 (1998) (concluding that a restitution order should
abate with the rest of the criminal conviction when a defendant dies pending direct
appeal of his case, except for when a defendant dies by his own hand); see also
Opinion Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice (June 19, 1995) (holding that a restitution order abates upon
the extension of a presidential pardon to a convicted offender), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/pardon3.19.htm. This memo lends support to the view of a
restitution order as an aspect of criminal punishment.
253. See supra Part L.F.2.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Pogue, 19 F.3d 663, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (mooting
the issue of the abatement of a restitution order imposed under the VWPA because
the defendant's estate was valueless); United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846, 856-57
(9th Cir. 1989) ("Cloud I") (declining to consider the use of the abatement doctrine to
a then-living defendant's appeal of a restitution order authorized by the VWPA that
required payment of any remaining restitution upon his death). But cf. United States
v. Cloud, 921 F.2d 225, 226-27 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Cloud I") (noting the penal and
compensatory aspects of restitution orders under the VWPA, but deciding as a matter
of statutory interpretation that the "'cease upon death' provision" of 18 U.S.C. §
3565(h) (2000) could not be interpreted to restrict restitution payments authorized by
the VWPA).
255. 739 F.2d 175, 176-78 (4th Cir. 1984). Recall that the VWPA only became law
in 1982. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
256. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 177. The Fourth Circuit has yet to rule on whether
retroactive application of the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See supra
text accompanying note 210.
257. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 177. Such conventional aspects of a criminal sentence
include a prison term, a fine, and a forfeiture order. See id. at 176 n.2, 177.
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Pursuing these traditional penal objectives against a deceased criminal
appellant would be futile, but allowing the compensatory restitution
order to survive would not be.25 Therefore, the restitution order did
not abate with the death of the appellant. 9
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Christopher, joined the Fourth
Circuit in holding that compensatory restitution orders imposed under
the VWPA and MVRA do not abate with the remainder of the
criminal sentence when a defendant dies during his criminal appeal.26°
Although the Third Circuit previously held that the MVRA increases
punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause,26' the
Christopher decision relied on precedent from the circuit that showed
that the purpose of restitution orders under the MVRA was to make
victims whole,262 and that restitution orders were distinguishable from
fines.263 However, neither the Fourth Circuit Dudley decision nor the
Third Circuit Christopher decision attempted to analyze the
inconsistency that exists between the wording of the VWPA and
MVRA and the creation of an exception to the abatement doctrine
for compensatory restitution orders. 264  Both statutes require an
underlying predicate conviction of the defendant before an imposition
of a restitution order.265 If the conviction is treated as if it never
existed, it is unclear on what basis the court is authorized to uphold a
restitution order.
2. The Minority View
The Eleventh Circuit disagrees with the Third and Fourth Circuits
on the abatement of restitution orders.266 In United States v. Logal,
267
the Eleventh Circuit relied on three grounds to decide that restitution
orders abate with the death of a criminal defendant awaiting
258. See id. at 177-78.
259. Id. at 178.
260. United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2001).
261. See United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); see also supra Part
II.A (discussing the Ex Post Facto Clause).
262. Christopher, 273 F.3d at 298 (citing United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312
(3d Cir. 2001)).
263. Id. at 298-99 (citing United States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2001);
United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1991)).
264. See infra notes 283-85, 293 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1998) (questioning the basis for the survival of a
restitution order under the VWPA when the predicate conviction has been vacated);
United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting the same statutory
problem with the VWPA). The MVRA similarly requires a conviction before a court
can order restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2000).
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A), A(a)(1) (both requiring a defendant to have
been convicted of a criminal offense before restitution can be ordered).
266. Although only the Eleventh Circuit has officially decided what this Note calls
the minority opinion, the Second Circuit would probably support its position, given
the proper set of facts. See supra note 262.
267. 106 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1997).
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resolution of his direct appeal.268  First, the Logal court relied on
circuit precedent that a restitution order imposed under the VWPA is
a criminal penalty.269 Second, the court pointed to the statutory
problem that exists with allowing a restitution order to remain when
the underlying conviction has been nullified.270  Lastly, the Logal
opinion believed that upholding a criminal restitution order when the
defendant's death precluded completing the appeal process violated
the finality principle.271 Moreover, abating the restitution order would
not give the defendant's estate a "windfall, '27 2 because the victims of
the defendant's crime could always sue the defendant's estate in civil
court for damages.273
3. The Neutral View
The Fifth Circuit initially joined the Fourth Circuit majority opinion
in United States v. Asset274 in 1993. Asset held that if the goal of a
restitution order was to punish the offender, the order abated upon
his death along with the rest of his sentence and conviction.275
However, if the primary objective of the restitution order was to
compensate the victim, the order survived, because the abatement
doctrine was only concerned with ending the punishment of offenders
who died while their appeal was pending. 276  The Asset court
concluded that the goal of restitution orders imposed pursuant to the
VWPA, as opposed to restitution orders authorized by other statutes,
was predominantly compensatory277 and thus the restitution order
survived abatement. 27  The Asset holding was reaffirmed in United
States v. Mmahat.
79
268. Id. at 1551-52.
269. Id. at 1552 (citing United States v. Johnson, 983 F.2d 216, 220 (11th Cir.
1993)); see supra Part II.A (noting that the Eleventh Circuit agrees that application of
the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); see also United States v. Twitty, 107
F.3d 1482, 1493 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Restitution is not a civil matter; it is a criminal
penalty meant to have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect." (citation omitted)).
270. Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552; see also United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908-09
(2d Cir. 1998) (questioning the "analytical underpinnings" of a restitution exception
to the abatement doctrine once the conviction has been vacated).
271. Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552; see infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text (further
discussing the finality principle).
272. Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552.
273. Id.; see also United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 416 n.17 (5th Cir.
2004) (noting the availability of civil remedies).
274. 990 F.2d 208, 210-15 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing to the Dudley decision multiple
times).
275. Id. at 214.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 213-14 (citing United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 982-83 (5th Cir.
1990)). The Asset holding was reaffirmed in United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 93
(5th Cir. 1997).
278. Asset, 990 F.2d at 214.
279. 106 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1997).
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The Fifth Circuit revisited the intersection of the abatement
doctrine and restitution orders in United States v. Estate of Parsons
("Parsons 1").280 The Parsons I court recognized that although the
compensatory civil purpose of restitution supported the circuit's
precedent that restitution orders did not abate upon death, this
holding did not seem to be consistent with the language of the VWPA,
which requires a conviction before a restitution order can be
considered.281 Since the abatement doctrine treated the deceased
defendant as if he "had never been indicted and convicted, 282 there
would appear to be no basis for the survival of the restitution order-
punitive or compensatory.283 Nevertheless, the Parsons I court upheld
the circuit precedent, even though it was "not convinced '284 that the
precedent conformed to the language of the VWPA 85
The Parsons I decision was vacated for an en banc rehearing of the
restitution issue.286 In the rehearing ("Parsons H"),287 the entire Fifth
Circuit had a chance to reject or uphold the punitive/compensatory
analysis of the Mmahat and Asset line of cases. Instead, the Parsons II
court considered two rationales that it felt supported the abatement
doctrine: the finality principle and the punishment principle.28
The finality principle "reasons that the state should not label one as
guilty until he has exhausted his opportunity to appeal. The
punishment principle asserts that the state should not punish a dead
person or his estate., 289 While the punishment principle supported the
survival of compensatory non-punitive restitution orders, it did not
explain why the conviction and indictment-not just the sentence-of
a deceased criminal appellant were also nullified by the abatement
doctrine.290
The Parsons H court chose to apply the finality principle over the
punishment principle, arguing that the crucial reason for the
abatement doctrine was to "prevent[] a wrongly-accused defendant
from standing convicted." '291 It reasoned that the presumption of
innocence required that a defendant have access to an appeal before
his conviction could be considered complete, and that in effect,
abatement "abdicate[d] [the criminal court's] power over the former
defendant," and treated the defendant as if he had never committed a
280. 314 F.3d 745, 748-50 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Parsons I"), vacated for reh'g en banc,
333 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 2003).
281. Parsons 1, 314 F.3d at 749; see 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2000).
282. Parsons I, 314 F.3d at 748.
283. Id. at 749 (citing United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1998)).
284. Id. at 750.
285. Id.
286. United States v. Estate of Parsons, 333 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 2003).
287. United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Parsons II").
288. Id. at 413.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 414.
291. Id. at 415.
[Vol. 732748
SERVING TWO MASTERS
crime.292 Therefore, either a compensatory or a penal restitution
order based on a completely vacated conviction could not survive.293
In upholding the finality principle as the main reason for the
abatement doctrine, Parsons II overruled the Mmahat294 and Asset295
holdings that compensatory restitution orders survive the death of a
defendant who dies while awaiting resolution of his appeal.296 But
presumably, that does not imply that Parsons H overruled the opinion
of those two cases that restitution orders authorized by the VWPA are
chiefly compensatory in nature.297 But a vigorous six-judge dissent
opined that by holding the restitution order abatable, the majority was
treating restitution as "impliedly punitive '298 in nature. The dissent
cited to cases from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits299 in its conclusion
that restitution orders pursuant to the MVRA and VWPA were
"expressly compensatory, non-punitive, and equivalent to a civil
judgment."300
Thus, a federal criminal defendant ordered to pay restitution under
the VWPA or MVRA, who dies before his direct appeal is resolved,
will have his restitution order treated in the following different ways.
The Third and Fourth Circuit, based on their views that the main
purpose of the VWPA and MVRA is to make victims whole, will hold
that the restitution order was compensatory, and it will survive the
vacation of the conviction and indictment.3"1 The Fifth Circuit will
abate the restitution order without determining if the restitution order
was penal or compensatory.3 2 The Eleventh Circuit will abate the
restitution order along with the conviction because it holds that
restitution is inherently a criminal penalty.30 3 As of January 2005, no
other circuit has passed judgment on this issue.30 4
292. Id. at 416.
293. Id. at 415 n.15 (noting that making distinctions between compensatory and
punitive restitution orders was irrelevant for the abatement doctrine); id. at 416-17
(indicating the conflict between the statutory language of the VWPA requiring a
predicate conviction and the carving out of an exception to the abatement doctrine
for compensatory restitution orders).
294. United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1997).
295. United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1993).
296. Parsons H, 367 F.3d at 415.
297. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Richards,
204 F.3d 177, 212-13 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the MVRA increases criminal
punishment and that its retroactive application would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
298. Parsons H, 367 F.3d at 422.
299. Id. at 423-25 (citing United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d
531 (7th Cir. 1998)).
300. Id. at 422.
301. See supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
304. A reasonable inference is that the Second Circuit would side with the
Eleventh Circuit on this issue, given the proper facts in a case. See supra notes 264,
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As is evident from Parts II.A and II.B, the definition of restitution
is divided among the circuits in at least two areas of law that directly
affect criminal defendants and their estates. But, as Part II.C shows,
restitution has also not been characterized in a uniform fashion within
several individual circuits. This type of circuit split regarding the
purpose of restitution is another reason why a Supreme Court
decision on this issue would be highly beneficial.
C. Discrepancies in the Treatment of the VWPA and MVRA at the
Circuit Level
Federal circuit courts that considered defendants' appeals to
restitution orders in the few years after the passage of the original
VWPA universally agreed that restitution was a criminal penalty.
These appeals challenged the placement of restitution in the
sentencing process on the grounds that it violated the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial for civil matters.30 6 The seven circuits
that evaluated these challenges all agreed that judicial imposition of
restitution, a traditional criminal remedy, as part of a criminal
sentence did not violate the Seventh Amendment.3"7 Additionally,
most of these decisions specifically noted that the statutory language
allowing a victim to enforce a restitution order in the same manner as
270. For the remaining circuits, this Note predicts that the respective circuits' view of
restitution as a penal or compensatory tool will play a role in the analysis of
restitution and the abatement doctrine. Based on the view of the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits that restitution is a civil remedy, these two circuits would most likely rule that
restitution orders would not abate when a criminal defendant dies while awaiting
resolution of his appeal.
305. See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 1985) (calling
restitution a "traditional criminal remedy"); United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475,
479-80 (3d Cir. 1985) (agreeing with five other circuits that a VWPA restitution order
was a criminal, not a civil, penalty); United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("Congress made restitution under the [VWPA] a criminal penalty.");
United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616, 617 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Restitution is a
permissible penalty imposed on the defendant as part of sentencing."); United States
v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827. 837 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[H]istory is replete with references
to restitution as part of the criminal sentence."); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d
905, 909 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that "[r]estitution undoubtedly serves [the] traditional
purposes of punishment" by adding to the deterrent effect of imprisonment and fines,
serves "society's interest in peaceful retribution," and acts as a "useful step toward
rehabilitation"); United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating
that restitution is an "aspect of criminal punishment"). For a thorough analysis of the
implications of the original VWPA, see generally Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin,
Project, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box- The Restitution Provisions of the Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 507 (1984).
306. U.S. Const. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law.., the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved .... ").
307. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 801 ("What matters is that criminal restitution is not
some newfangled effort to get around the Seventh Amendment but a traditional
criminal remedy."); Palma, 760 F.2d at 480; Keith, 754 F.2d at 1392; Watchman, 749
F.2d at 617; Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 837; Brown, 744 F.2d at 908; Florence, 741 F.2d at
1068.
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a civil action did not alter the criminal quality of the restitution.3"8 A
passage from the Seventh Circuit decision in United States v.
Fountain 9 by Judge Richard Posner eloquently expresses the federal
circuits' general understanding of the historical place of restitution in
criminal law in the mid-1980s:
If by "restitution" in criminal law (a distinct concept from civil
restitution) we mean simply an order in a criminal case that the
criminal restore to his victim what he has taken from him, we are
speaking of a form of criminal remedy that predates the Seventh
Amendment. Restitution indeed is the earliest criminal remedy ....
Even after the rise of the state we find restitution used as a criminal
remedy ....
The question is, what does restitution as a criminal remedy
comprehend? As the word implies and history confirms, the original
conception is that of forcing the criminal to yield up to his victim the
fruits of the crime. The crime is thereby made worthless to the
criminal. This form of criminal restitution is sanctioned not only by
history but also by its close relationship to the retributive and
deterrent purposes of criminal punishment. The fact that tort law may
also have deterrent purposes... does not make every payment to the
victim of crime a tort sanction; it just shows that tort and criminal law
overlap.310
308. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 800 (finding "unpersuasive" the argument that civil
enforcement by the victim of the restitution order violated the Seventh Amendment);
Keith, 754 F.2d at 1392 (statutory language including victim enforcement did not
make a criminal sentencing proceeding into an "action at common law"(citation
omitted)); Watchman, 749 F.2d at 617 ("The [civil] enforcement method does not ...
determine the nature of the order."); Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 838-39 (stating that
"[c]ivil enforcement of criminal penalties is not a new concept," and that the
extension of the civil enforcement right to a victim did not convert a restitution order
into a civil remedy); Brown, 744 F.2d at 910 (victim enforcement of restitution order
did not change order into a civil judgment, and congressional intent in including
victim enforcement in the statute was to improve their chances of actually getting
restitution); Florence, 741 F.2d at 1067 (finding that victim enforcement did not
transform a restitution order into a civil action). As a further corroboration of the
circuits' view of the criminal nature of restitution, the Ninth, Eleventh, and Eighth
Circuits also cited to the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242 (1980), the case which reiterated the two-prong, seven-factor Mendoza-Martinez
test for analyzing the criminal or civil nature of a statute. See Keith, 754 F.2d at 1391;
Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 836; Florence, 741 F.2d at 1068; see supra notes 151-56 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ward case and the Mendoza-Martinez test). The
circuits' citation to Ward did not include evaluations of the VWPA under the seven
factors from the second prong of the Mendoza-Martinez test. Because the first prong
of the test requires a court to determine if the statute, on its face, imposes criminal
punishment, a reasonable inference is that these courts felt that the intent of a
restitution order under the VWPA was undeniably criminal, thus foregoing the need
to go beyond the threshold question of the first prong of the test to reach the seven
factors. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong
nature of the test used to evaluate the civil or criminal nature of statutes).
309. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985).
310. Id. at 800 (citations omitted).
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To illustrate the Seventh Circuit's current view of restitution as a
civil remedy in the context of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and how this
view has changed dramatically from the circuit's view of restitution as
a criminal remedy in the context of a Seventh Amendment challenge,
this Note refers to the decision by Judge Posner in United States v.
Bach,311 where he upheld the United States v. Newman312 decision that
restitution under the MVRA was not constrained by the Ex Post
Facto Clause:
Crimes and torts frequently overlap. In particular, most crimes that
cause definite losses to ascertainable victims are also torts: the
crime of theft is the tort of conversion; the crime of assault is the tort
of battery ... Functionally, the [MVRA] is a tort statute, though one
that casts back to a much earlier era of Anglo-American law, when
criminal and tort proceedings were not clearly distinguished. The
[MVRA] enables the tort victim to recover his damages in a
summary proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution. We do not
see why this procedural innovation.., should trigger rights under
the ex post facto clause. It is a detail from a defrauder's standpoint
whether he is ordered to make good his victims' losses in a tort suit
or in the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution.313
In making his ruling in Bach, Judge Posner did not cite to his well
reasoned and thorough Fountain opinion that in a Seventh
Amendment challenge to the VWPA, restitution was a traditional
criminal remedy. Judge Posner did not explain in Bach why his
opinion about restitution in the context of an ex post facto challenge
had changed so drastically from the Fountain context of a Seventh
Amendment challenge. If restitution is a criminal penalty for one
context, it seems logical and consistent that it should be for another as
well.314 It is unclear why Judge Posner thought that restitution
imposed by the VWPA, which was discretionary and required the
judge to take into account the defendant's financial status when
deciding whether to order restitution, was a criminal punishment
imposed as part of sentencing, while restitution ordered under the
MVRA, which is mandatory and prevents the judge from considering
311. 172 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 1999).
312. 144 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 236-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the Newman case).
313. Bach, 172 F.3d at 523 (citations omitted); see supra note 29 for a contrary
opinion regarding the streamlining effect of imposing restitution via the MVRA.
Also, this passage, especially the reference to the historical understanding of
restitution as a criminal remedy, clearly contradicts Judge Posner's own analysis of
restitution in a Seventh Amendment context. See supra notes 309-10 and
accompanying text.
314. See United States v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319 (D. Utah 2004)
(stating that "there appears to be no basis in the case law for distinguishing between
what is a penalty for Sixth Amendment purposes as opposed to ex post facto
purposes"); see also Newman, 144 F.3d at 539 ("[R]estitution cannot be punishment
under only one statute but not the other.").
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the defendant's financial status except when deciding on the
restitution payment schedule, is merely a supplementary civil
proceeding.
It is also not necessarily only a "detail" '315 from the defendant's
standpoint, as Judge Posner wrote in Bach, whether the defendant pay
the victim through a mandatory restitution order imposed as part of a
criminal sentence, or through a civil jury trial. For example, an order
of restitution, whether discretionary or mandatory, can be enforced in
the same manner as a fine, which is a criminal remedy.316 Such
enforcement can include a revocation of parole,317 and a re-sentencing
of the defendant to prison if he is found to have willfully avoided the
payment of restitution.318 A civil judgment does not carry the same
possibility of a prison sentence as a method of enforcement. Also,
there is a distinct possibility that a jury in a civil trial might find that a
different quantity of damages would compensate the victim as
compared to a restitution order that a judge has crafted based on a
pre-sentence report from a probation officer.319
When the Third Circuit, in United States v. Christopher,320
considered an appeal to abate a deceased defendant's criminal
sentence which included a restitution order, the court acknowledged
its own holding in United States v. Edwards321 that restitution was
criminal punishment for ex post facto purposes. But, the Christopher
court held that a restitution order authorized under the MVRA,
315. Bach, 172 F.3d at 523.
316. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i) (2004).
317. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(1) (2000) (effect of default of a fine or restitution).
318. See 18 U.S.C. § 3614 (resentencing upon failureto pay a fine or restitution).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1311-27 (D. Utah
2004). The judge in this case spent sixteen pages of the opinion determining the
amount of restitution he would impose on two defendants to replace the two deceased
victims' lost income to their respective families. The judge employed an actuarial
expert to determine that the lost income of one victim was between $40,907 and
$850,959. Id. at 1314. The lost income of the second victim was determined to be
between $17,118 and $576,106. Id. at 1315. The court then considered, and rejected,
making any race, sex, geographic, and/or consumption reductions in the potential
restitution awards. See id. at 1315-27. The first victim was an aspiring artist. Id. at
1320. Based on the opinions of his art teachers, the judge concluded that this first
victim would have succeeded at being a professional artist. Id. at 1321. But, the judge
concluded, he would only have been employed as a professional artist for 60% of the
time. Id. The judge then decided to take the "lowest race-neutral" future lost income
estimate of this victim and to apply a 40% discount to it, resulting in a restitution
award of $446,665 for the first victim's family. Id. It is well within the realm of
possibility that a jury might have come up with a different restitution amount if it had
considered the issue. The judge himself noted that the "assumptions one makes
about the future of a victim.., can make vast differences in the calculations." Id. at
1324; see also United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 790 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part) (criticizing pre-sentence reports as "bureaucratically prepared" and "hearsay-
riddled").
320. 273 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2001); see supra notes 260-63 and accompanying
text.
321. 162 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 1998); see supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
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unlike a criminal forfeiture or a fine, did not abate with the rest of the
criminal sentence because it was compensatory in nature.322
Inexplicably, the Christopher court simply stated that "our opinion in
Edwards is not in conflict with our consideration of the abatement
effect on restitution orders," without offering an attempt at
reconciling the potentially contradictory results.323
In essence, after Christopher, if Congress amends the MVRA in the
future so as to somehow increase the amount of restitution a
defendant has to pay, the MVRA could not be applied to a defendant
in the Third Circuit whose offense predated this hypothetical
amendment (because restitution is a criminal penalty under the
Edwards decision), but a restitution order would apply to a defendant
whose offense postdated the amendment, but who died before his
appeal was heard (because restitution is merely compensatory in
nature under the Christopher holding). The defendant in Edwards
was convicted of conspiracy, bank fraud, money laundering, and
criminal forfeiture.324 The defendant in Christopher was convicted of
mail fraud, making false statements to the Social Security
Administration ("SSA"), theft of cable services, and trafficking in
counterfeit devices.325 There does not seem to be a logical distinction
to make as to why restitution is criminal punishment for an ex post
facto analysis pursuant to bank fraud and money laundering, but is
only compensatory for abatement purposes pursuant to mail fraud
and lying to the SSA, and the Christopher court does not offer one.326
Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C have highlighted a range of conflicts that
exist in and among the federal circuits that pertain directly to
disagreement over the classification of restitution orders authorized
by the VWPA and MVRA as either criminal or civil. Part II.D
discusses a new Sixth Amendment challenge to the VWPA and
MVRA that depends on the definition of restitution as criminal
punishment. Although this new challenge has produced much less
disagreement among federal judges than the ex post facto and
abatement doctrines, it is another area that highlights the need for a
Supreme Court decision categorizing the intent of the federal
restitution statutes.
322. Christopher, 273 F.3d at 299.
323. Id.
324. Edwards, 162 F.3d at 88.
325. Christopher, 273 F.3d at 295.
326. See also United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
restitution is criminal punishment in the context of a Sixth Amendment challenge to a
restitution order); infra note 348.
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D. A Possible Violation of the Sixth Amendment by the VWPA and
MVRA -A Novel Constitutional Challenge
The Sixth Amendment provides for a right to a jury trial "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions. 32 7 In the last few years, the Supreme Court
has ruled on several cases that concern the violation of the protection
that the Sixth Amendment affords to criminal defendants. The Court
has focused on the respective roles of the judge and jury in fact-
finding and criminal sentencing.3 28 The rule that has evolved from this
line of cases comes from the recent Court opinion in Blakely v.
Washington,329 which states that the maximum sentence a judge can
impose on a defendant, without violating the Sixth Amendment, can
only be based "solely on... the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant."330 The judge may not rely on any
"additional findings" to increase punishment beyond the facts that the
jury had at its disposal.' The judge "exceeds his proper authority" if
he "inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow. "332
The facts that the jury relies on must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.333 The importance of this rule is to ensure that juries are
allowed the full authority granted to them by the framers.3 34
The relevance of this line of cases to the context of restitution
orders is apparent when one looks at the procedural statute for the
enforcement of restitution orders imposed under the VWPA and
MVRA.335 Section 3664 of the MVRA requires a court to order the
probation officer to compile a post-trial, post-conviction, pre-sentence
report that the court will use to calculate a defendant's restitution
327. U.S. Const. amend. VI, § 1.
328. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) ("When a judge
inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found
all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds
his proper authority." (citation omitted)); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002)
("Capital defendants.., are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the
legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000) (finding unconstitutional a "legislative scheme that
removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal
defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished
according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone"); Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (holding that under "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt").
329. 124 S. Ct. at 2531.
330. Id. at 2537.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 2536 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); see also id. at 2543 ("[E]very
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally
essential to the punishment.").
334. Id. at 2539, 2543.
335. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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order.336 The probation officer is in charge of collecting the relevant
financial facts from the victim, defendant, and the U.S. attorney.
3 7
Most importantly, § 3664 provides in part: "Any dispute as to the
proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by
the preponderance of the evidence. '38  Facially, if restitution is
indeed a criminal penalty, the statutory construction of the
enforcement mechanism of the VWPA and MVRA seems to be
contradictory to the direction given by Blakely and its predecessor
Apprendi v. New Jersey,339 regarding the scope of the court's authority
to inflict punishment based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by
a defendant.
Although the Blakely and Apprendi decisions were concerned with
the imposition of jail terms, and Blakely caused federal courts to treat
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in a number of different ways,3 4 °
the cases have also led to a constitutional challenge to the imposition
of restitution orders pursuant to the VWPA and MVRA. The core of
the challenge is that assuming restitution orders are part of a
defendant's criminal punishment,34' an imposition of restitution
increases a defendant's punishment based on facts found by a judge
contained in a pre-sentence report which may not have been
presented to a jury at trial, and the evidence standard the judge is
required to use is constitutionally impermissible in a criminal case.342
This challenge has yet to be upheld by any federal court.343 Although
there is no current circuit split on this specific restitution issue, it has
336. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(a) (2004).
337. Id. § 3664(d)(1)-(3).
338. Id. § 3664(e) (emphasis added).
339. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
340. See Laurie P. Cohen, Double Standard: In Wake of Ruling, Disarray Plagues
Federal Sentencing, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 2004, at Al (noting that since the Blakely
case, federal courts have "come up with a myriad of ways to sentence defendants").
Presumably, this "myriad" of sentencing schemes will now have to conform to the
ruling from the Supreme Court that applied the Blakely case to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755 (2005)
("[Our holding in Blakely applies to the [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines.").
341. See supra Parts IL.A-C (regarding circuit splits on the criminal/civil view of the
restitution statutes).
342. See United States v. Tomlinson, 110 Fed. Appx. 835, 836 (9th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished opinion) (vacating and remanding the defendants' sentences because
"potential Blakely issues exist with regard to the loss and restitution calculations
which were based in part on facts neither found by a jury nor admitted by the
appellants"); United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 608 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on
Apprendi); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed.
Sentencing Rep. 316, 317 (2004) (stating that "Blakely has thrown into doubt those
decisions authorizing judges to make findings necessary for... restitution awards,"
and that "[r]estitution ordered as part of sentencing is open to the same sort of
[constitutional] attack" as forfeiture awards).
343. The only possible exception to this assertion is the Tomlinson opinion. See
supra note 341. However, this is an unpublished opinion that has limited precedential
value.
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prompted a significant and growing amount of discussion at the
federal level, and needs to be resolved along with the ex post facto
and abatement conflicts.
The issue of whether restitution orders are punishment for the
purposes of Blakely and the Sixth Amendment is essentially
determined by what the various federal circuits think about the
civil/criminal issue when analyzing a potential ex post facto
violation.344 Although the majority of federal circuits hold that
restitution is a criminal penalty,3 45 all federal circuits that have
considered the Sixth Amendment challenge to restitution orders have,
as of January 2005, struck it down.3 46  The circuits that believe
restitution is a civil remedy have used that position as a specific reason
to reject restitution appeals.3 47 The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
hold that restitution is a criminal penalty for Apprendi purposes, but
have relied on other grounds to achieve the same goal.348
The importance of the Blakely decision to the constitutionality of
the restitution statutes, and to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is
that it has been interpreted as refining the Apprendi rule, which states
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the.., statutory maximum must be
344. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Ex Post Facto Clause and the federal
restitution statutes).
345. See supra Part II.A.
346. See supra notes 342-43 (noting one possible exception to date to this
assertion).
347. See United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on
circuit precedent that restitution is a civil remedy, and therefore not punishment for
Apprendi purposes, as one ground to deny a restitution appeal); United States v.
Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319 (D. Utah 2004) (relying on the "law of the
[Tenth] Circuit" that restitution is compensatory, not punitive, to determine that the
Blakely and Apprendi decisions did not apply to restitution). Although the Fourth
Circuit has yet to rule on the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the MVRA, a
federal district court in the circuit has said that Blakely does not require jury fact-
finding for restitution orders because restitution is not a criminal penalty. See United
States v. Burrell, No. 2:03CR10095, 2004 WL 1490246, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Va. July 6,
2004).
348. See United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 608-09 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that
restitution is a criminal penalty, but that the restitution statutes contain no
"prescribed" maximum which could be violated); United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131,
159 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "restitution ordered under [the VWPAJ constitutes
'the penalty for a crime' within the meaning of Apprendi," but finding that the
restitution order did not go beyond any statutory maximum); United States v.
Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1042 n.4 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the opinion that
restitution was a civil remedy was "clearly at odds with the case law" from other
circuits that restitution was, at least in part, punishment, but that no statutory
maximum was violated); see also United States v. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that there is an "element of sophistry in stating that
something imposed as part of a sentence in a criminal case is in fact not punishment
for the crime," but finding that the MVRA had no statutory maximum that a judge
could overstep).
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submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 349
Blakely strongly declared the rule that the "statutory maximum" for
sentencing purposes was not what was listed in a statute as the
absolute maximum punishment in the jurisdiction for that specific
offense, but rather the maximum punishment that could be imposed
by a judge based only on facts that the jury had found beyond a
reasonable doubt.
If anything, United States v. Booker,35' which applied the Court's
reasoning from Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, has
arguably further enhanced the relevancy of the Blakely understanding
of the "statutory maximum" for sentencing purposes. Booker
removed any mention of a "statutory maximum" when it reaffirmed
the Apprendi holding.352 Booker stated that "[a]ny fact.. . which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 353 Thus, the Booker rule reiterated that it is the facts put to a
jury, not statutory language, which controls the legal extent of a
judge's authority to craft a defendant's sentence, whether it be jail
time or any other associated criminal penalty.
The vast majority of federal judges that have heard Sixth
Amendment challenges to federal restitution orders have used the
"statutory maximum" language from the Apprendi decision as one
method of striking down the challenges.3 4 The reasoning these courts
have used is that the language of the MVRA and VWPA does not
349. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (confirming the same
statement written in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
350. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004); see also Visinaiz, 344 F.
Supp. 2d at 1326 (referring to "Blakely's expansive interpretation of what constitutes
a statutory maximum").
351. 125 S. Ct. 738, 755-56 (2005) (concluding that Blakely applies to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
352. Id. at 756 (reaffirming the Apprendi rule without the "statutory maximum"
language).
353. Id.
354. See United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 547 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that
no statutory maximum was violated because there was no disputed issue of fact as to
the amount of restitution); United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1144 n.1 (10th Cir.
2004) (noting that the defendant's restitution argument failed because the award did
"not exceed any prescribed statutory maximum"); United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d
600, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159 (3d Cir.
2002) (same); United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1042 (6th Cir. 2001) (same);
United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); United States
v. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that the MVRA
contains no statutory maximum that a judge can go beyond). At least two state courts
have used the same reasoning to strike down appeals to state restitution orders. See
People v. Horne, 767 N.E.2d 132, 138-39 (N.Y. 2002) (no statutory maximum was
violated); State v. White, No. W2003-00751-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2326708, at *23-
24 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (finding that restitution is criminal punishment
under Tennessee law, but that no statutory maximum was violated).
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contain a maximum restitution amount beyond which a judge may not
impose restitution; rather, the restitution order is based on the
maximum amount of each specific victim's loss, so that a restitution
order can never go beyond the maximum in the statute.355 This
reasoning arguably contradicts the understanding of how Blakely, and
now Booker, have altered the understanding of the Apprendi use of
the term "statutory maximum. 3 56  Therefore, the contestable issue
debatably is not what the restitution statutes state is the maximum
amount of restitution available for a judge to impose, but the
maximum based on facts put to a jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt.
As of January 2005, only one federal district court, in United States
v. Vizinais,3 57 has specifically identified that Blakely has altered the
understanding of the term "statutory maximum" for the purposes of
punishment, calling it a "difficult question" whether Blakely changed
the understanding of that term in a manner that might require fact-
finding by a jury for restitution orders." 8 The Visinaiz decision
observed that courts that had addressed this issue had used a pre-,
rather than a post-, Blakely view of the "statutory maximum" term.359
Although the Visinaiz decision acknowledged the issue, it avoided
addressing the conflict by finding Blakely not applicable to restitution
orders on other grounds." ° How future courts in other circuits will
deal with the "difficult question "361 of the Blakely decision remains to
be seen.362
355. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2004) (ordering the court to impose
restitution in the "full amount of each victim's losses").
356. See King & Klein, supra note 342, at 317.
357. 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah 2004).
358. Id. at 1326.
359. Id.
360. Id. (concluding that restitution is not a criminal penalty, and that the relevant
historical record showed a predilection that judges, not juries, determined restitution
awards).
361. Id.; see also United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 526 n.2, 530 n.5 (7th Cir.
2005) (finding that based on precedent, restitution awards do not violate the statutory
maximum understanding of Blakely et al., and noting in a footnote that a restitution
order, as part of the sentencing phase of a trial, does not require more than a
preponderance of evidence standard to be enforceable, but acknowledging the
possibility that its reasoning might not survive the Booker and Fanfan cases currently
being reviewed by the Supreme Court). See supra note 26 (discussing the Booker and
Fanfan cases).
362. Following the release of the Booker decision in January 2005, several federal
courts have now acknowledged the emerging conflict between the federal restitution
statutes and the Booker case. See United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 554 n.12
(6th Cir. 2005) (noting that "there is some question as to whether Booker requires us
to reconsider our analysis of criminal defendants' jury trial rights with respect to
restitution orders," but declining to express an opinion on this "important and
complex question" because the parties had not addressed it in their briefs or oral
arguments); United States v. Garcia-Castillo, No. 03-2166, 2005 WL 327698, at *5 n.4
(10th Cir. Feb. 11, 2005) (recognizing the conflict between the federal circuits and
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Part II has outlined three areas of the law that would be
significantly affected by a Supreme Court decision on the criminal or
civil function of restitution orders imposed under the VWPA and
MVRA. Part II has also detailed the inconsistency of judicial
treatment of restitution orders by federal judges between the circuits,
and within circuits as well. Part III offers this Note's conclusions
about restitution, advocates a single, unified classification of all
restitution orders, and proposes a potential secondary alternative
solution.
III. ALL VWPA AND MVRA RESTITUTION ORDERS SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
RESTITUTION ORDERS TO GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES SHOULD BE
EXEMPTED FROM ANY RULING THAT RESTITUTION ORDERS ARE
CIVIL
Considering the inter-circuit divisions analyzed in Parts II.A and
II.B,3 63 the examples of contradictions within the Third and Seventh
Circuits discussed in Part II.C,3 4 and the innovative Sixth Amendment
constitutional challenge in Part II.D,365 the nature of restitution
authorized by the VWPA and MVRA needs to be addressed by the
Supreme Court in an appropriate case. The conflict over the nature of
restitution is not a minor dispute that can be ignored in the hopes that
it will once more recede into a forgotten corner of the criminal justice
system.366 This is because however widely split the federal circuits are
on the purpose of restitution, they agree that Congress intended
courts to increase the use of restitution as a remedy.367 The more
restitution is ordered by judges, the more pressing the need to have it
imposed in an equal fashion on defendants in similar situations.
Defining restitution as criminal punishment or a civil remedy pursuant
stating that "whether restitution is subject to Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker [is] by no
means [a] settled question[] in courts around the country").
363. See supra Parts II.A-B.
364. See supra Part II.C.
365. See supra Part II.D.
366. See Gilbert, supra note 9 (noting the possibility of restitution assuming a
significant role in federal prosecutions); supra note 80 and accompanying text
(quoting the legislative history of the VWPA to show congressional intent in making
restitution more than an "afterthought").
367. See United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding an
expansive interpretation of the term "victim" to be "consistent with the intent and
purpose of the MVRA to expand, rather than limit, the restitution remedy"); United
States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004) ("The courts have held that
by defining 'victim' expansively in scheme-based crimes, Congress... expanded
district courts' authority to grant restitution." (internal quotation and citation
omitted)); United States v. Martin, 128 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the VWPA and, by implication, the MVRA, "demonstrate a clarion congressional
intent to provide restitution to as many victims and in as many cases as possible," and
that the history of the restitution statutes was "marked ... by [a] constant expansion
of the restitution remedy").
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to these statutes would help resolve the ex post facto and abatement
circuit contradictions, and significantly advance or diminish the
strength of the Sixth Amendment argument against the VWPA and
MVRA.
A. The Scope of the Problem
The breadth of the use of restitution by federal judges as outlined in
this Note indicates that restitution certainly has become much more
than an "afterthought 3 68 in the federal sentencing process. Courts
have included in restitution orders such items as the fee for the
services of a Navajo medicine man at a funeral.3 69 A large restitution
order can be a significant burden on a defendant who has served the
incarceration aspect of his criminal sentence, especially if the
defendant has little or no assets to his name.370 Many victims will be
compensated, at least in a symbolic manner, for their financial loss
associated with the actual offense, and the expenses of dealing with
the prosecution and criminal trial of the offender.371
There should be a consistent interpretation of the VWPA and the
MVRA statutes by all the federal circuits. A criminal defendant in
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits will have the MVRA or VWPA
applied to his crimes retroactively, because those circuits consider
restitution orders civil remedies,372 while in most other circuits the Ex
Post Facto Clause will prohibit this type of judgment.3 3 In the Third
and Fourth Circuits, restitution orders survive the death of a criminal
defendant awaiting resolution of his direct appeal,374 while the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits extend the abatement doctrine to include
restitution orders imposed as part of a criminal sentence.3 75 The Third
Circuit will apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to restitution orders under
the MVRA, because they act as criminal punishment, but it will not
apply the abatement doctrine to those same restitution orders when
they act to compensate victims.
37 6
It seems inherently unreasonable as a matter of public policy that a
criminal defendant will receive different treatment, under the
identical federal statute, of his or her restitution order by judges in
criminal sentencing proceedings by virtue of geography alone. In the
368. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
369. See United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1327-29 (D. Utah 2004).
370. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
371. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b) (2000) (restitution order requires repayment for
property loss, medical costs for any bodily injury, and costs associated with
participation of the victim in the investigation and prosecution of the case, including
child care, transportation, and lost income).
372. See supra Part II.A.2.
373. See supra Part II.A.1.
374. See supra Part II.B.1.
375. See supra Part II.B.2.
376. See supra Part II.C.
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same way that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are intended to
ensure a level of uniformity in jail sentences for defendants convicted
of the same federal crimes throughout the country, it seems logical
that the federal courts should be required to treat restitution imposed
on defendants as part of a criminal sentence in an equivalent manner.
B. Restitution Orders Are Criminal Punishment
It also seems intrinsically incorrect that as a matter of statutory
language and legislative history, some federal judges have
marginalized and isolated the penal core of the federal restitution
statutes, while concurrently advancing the compensatory goal of these
statutes as proof of their civil nature. However, this error goes
beyond misconstruing the modern legislative record of the dual goals
of restitution. It essentially ignores the more than four-thousand-year
record of restitution serving as an effective mechanism for fulfilling
society's dual goals of disciplining the offender and restoring the
victim.377
Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence pursuant to the
VWPA and MVRA may or may not be an exclusively criminal
punishment; it may also serve to compensate victims for their losses
due to the criminal acts of an offender. However, the fact that
restitution can also help to restore a victim to the state he was in
before he was injured by the offender's criminal actions does not
somehow remove the penal characteristics of restitution, and the case
law and legislative history have recognized this concept in many
instances.37 The restitution ordered pursuant to the MVRA or
VWPA is a valid, significant display of the police power of the federal
377. See supra notes 7, 36-43 and accompanying text.
378. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) (the fact that restitution
"resemble[s] a judgment 'for the benefit of' the victim" did not take away its penal
aspects); United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that the
statutory language and legislative history of the MVRA indicated that restitution was
criminal punishment that also had compensatory aspects); United States v. Satterfield,
743 F.2d 827, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that Congress intended restitution to be
part of the criminal sentence and help make victims whole); United States v. Brown,
744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the fact that Congress wanted, through
the VWPA, to ensure that victims had the best chance to receive the full amount of
restitution from their offenders did not remove the punitive characteristic of
restitution); supra note 78 and accompanying text (quoting language from the Senate
Report on the VWPA that refers to restitution as always having been part of criminal
justice, and that restitution, as part of society's authority to punish, helps to restore
victims); supra note 81 and accompanying text (quoting language from the Senate
Report on the VWPA that restitution could satisfy victims and help rehabilitate
defendants); supra note 96 and accompanying text (quoting language from the Senate
Report on the MVRA that mandatory restitution ensures that society recognizes the
harm done to crime victims, and that the defendant pay a debt to both society at large
and the individual victim); supra note 123 (quoting four different United States
senators from the legislative history of the MVRA emphasizing that restitution serves
both penal and compensatory goals).
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government to impose criminal punishment on violators of federal
statutes. In the same manner that Congress imposed restitution in the
earliest years of the nation as part of criminal sentences for citizens
that committed offenses against Native Americans,3 79 Congress
intended federal courts to use the VWPA and MVRA to augment the
criminal punishment of modern day offenders. Therefore, this Note
advocates that restitution orders imposed by federal courts under the
VWPA and MVRA, even if they simultaneously help compensate and
restore victims to their pre-victim status, should be considered
criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
abatement doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment.
C. Implications for the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine,
and the Sixth Amendment
There are several implications of this Note's position that
restitution orders act as criminal punishment. First, in order not to
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, no federal circuit should apply any
future, non-procedural, amendments of the restitution statutes
retroactively to punish defendants for criminal acts that ended prior to
those amendments.
Additionally, a restitution award should abate upon the death of a
defendant awaiting completion of his direct appeal of his criminal
conviction-along with all other aspects of a criminal case. This Note
supports the reasoning of the federal circuits that have identified the
logical conflict of upholding restitution orders as compensatory when
the underlying conviction upon which the restitution order stands has
been obliterated from a deceased defendant's record.38 ° Even if courts
decide that the compensatory purposes of certain restitution orders
outweigh their punitive effects in certain circumstances, and decline to
extend the abatement doctrine to them for that reason, the fact that
all federal circuits hold that the underlying indictment and conviction
abates with the defendant's death38 weakens the holding of the
federal circuits that believe that compensatory restitution orders
survive the death of a defendant.382
As for the Sixth Amendment issue, the position that restitution
orders act as criminal punishment, along with the holdings from the
Blakely383 and Apprendi3& 4 cases, leads to the conclusion that the
379. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part I.B. The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have reasoned
that upholding a restitution order against a deceased defendant that by statute
requires a predicate conviction (which every federal court agrees is erased by the
abatement doctrine) is illogical.
381. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
382. The Fourth and Third Circuits currently hold this opinion. See supra notes
255-65 and accompanying text.
383. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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restitution statutes, as currently enacted, impose restitution on
criminal defendants in an unconstitutional manner.385  The
restatement of the Apprendi holding by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Booker386 only makes the conflict between the statutory
language of the restitution statutes requiring post-conviction judicially
calculated restitution orders based on "bureaucratically prepared,
hearsay-riddled presentence reports" written by probation officers
and the mandate given by the Court for jury determination of all facts
necessary for punishment even starker. 87 For the most part, federal
courts have not truly comprehended, or have chosen to avoid, the
understanding of the Blakely analysis of the unconstitutionality of
judicial fact-finding acting to increase the punishment of criminal
defendants and its logical application to restitution orders.3 s8
Thus, the VWPA and MVRA should be amended to place the fact-
finding authority for the quantity of restitution awards in the hands of
the jury to comply with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.3 9
However, repercussions of this opinion on the unconstitutionality of
the restitution statutes as currently written will most likely be minimal
in nature. First, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases at the
federal level never involve a jury. Ninety-six percent of all federal
criminal convictions result from a plea agreement by the defendant. 9
The VWPA and MVRA both contain language authorizing courts to
impose restitution orders on defendants solely based on plea
agreements. 391 Because there is no reason to think that the percentage
of criminal convictions resulting from plea agreements is going to
decrease drastically in the future, the suggestion to amend the VWPA
and MVRA to include jury fact-finding would probably affect only an
extremely small number of criminal cases.392
384. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
385. See supra Part II.D (discussing the applicability of the Blakely and Apprendi
holdings to the federal restitution statutes).
386. 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
387. Id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
388. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 334 and accompanying text (regarding the Court's opinion of
the authority of jurors as the framers understood it).
390. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (citing Department of Justice
criminal conviction statistics from 2002).
391. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A)
(2000) ("The court may also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement,
restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense."); id. § A(a)(3) ("The court
shall also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons
other than the victim of the offense.").
392. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, joined by Souter,
J., and in part by Scalia, J.) (stating that the applicability of the Blakely holding to the
Sentencing Guidelines would be "consequential only in the tiny portion of
prospective sentencing decisions that are made after a defendant has been found
guilty by a jury").
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As a simpler alternative to Congress amending the language of the
VWPA and MVRA, federal prosecutors, in the small percentage of
criminal cases that empanel a jury, could take the same path to avoid
violating defendants' Sixth Amendment rights regarding restitution as
they have regarding defendants' jail terms. As Justice Stevens wrote
in his dissenting opinion in Booker, "[i]n many cases, prosecutors
could avoid an [Apprendi] problem simply by alleging in the
indictment the facts necessary to reach the chosen Guidelines
sentence." '393 Justice Stevens pointed out that federal prosecutors
have already been "[e]nhancing the specificity of indictments" in just
such a manner in order to comply with the Court's Blakely and
Apprendi decisions.394 The same reasoning is readily applicable to
facts that a judge requires for crafting restitution orders. Prosecutors
could allege these obligatory restitution facts in the indictment, prove
them to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and thereby avert any Sixth
Amendment problem with the VWPA and MVRA. This suggestion
would be easier to implement than a congressional amendment of the
VWPA and MVRA, as it would simply require a memo from the
Department of Justice advising the U.S. Attorneys to put it into
practice.
D. A Secondary Alternative to Finding All Restitution Orders Criminal
As a secondary option, even if the Supreme Court rules in a future
case that restitution orders under the VWPA and MVRA are a civil
remedy, it should exempt from this civil classification any restitution
orders that entail defendants paying back money that they have stolen
from a state or federal governmental entity.395 While the United
States is mentioned as a victim in the restitution statutes,396 it is clear
from the legislative history of both the VWPA and MVRA that
Congress was overwhelmingly concerned with human, not
governmental, victims of crime.397 There is no specific, identifiable,
393. Id. Justice Thomas did not join Justice Stevens's opinion but agreed with his
"proposed remedy and much of his analysis." Id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting in
part).
394. Id. at 775.
395. See supra note 113 (discussing the unanimous understanding of the federal
circuits that governmental agencies are considered victims for restitutionary
purposes).
396. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(i) (2004) ("In any case in which the United States is a
victim .... ").
397. See supra note 123 (noting remarks by senators regarding the MVRA and the
emotional damage suffered by human crime victims); see also S. Rep. No. 104-179, at
13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 926 (criticizing the low percentage of
restitution ordered by courts for crimes such as murder, kidnapping, robbery, and
sexual assault cases); id. at 17-18 (discussing violent crime, the psychological injuries
of victims of violent crime, and the benefits that even nominal restitution will have for
crime victims); S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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individual human "victim of crime' in the way the legislative history
uses that term when a defendant steals from a state agency.
When making restitution to the government, restitution is in many
ways equivalent to a fine, a traditional criminal remedy, which is paid
to the state as a representative of the society at large.398 In fact,
criminal restitution orders and criminal fines can be enforced in an
identical manner under the same statutes. 399 The injury that an
offender commits by stealing money from the government is a
generalized, nonspecific type of damage that really only has financial
implications. When a defendant pays money directly out of his pocket
to a human victim, the defendant is more likely to see how his actions
have directly hurt another living person, and that his criminal actions
have a specific consequence for them. A restitution order paid out to
the government will not make any human "victim" feel vindicated or
emotionally compensated as effectively as a payment from an
offender directly to a victim.
The VWPA has a provision for community restitution, where no
"identifiable victim" exists.4" Whose dignity would a payment under
this provision restore when a drug defendant pays money to a state
agency that then distributes the money to the community? It would
seem to be reasonable to label a restitution order to a governmental
unit as criminal punishment for an offense against the state, apart
from any future Supreme Court ruling that would categorize
restitution orders as civil. When the government demands money
from defendants as part of their criminal sentence, it is equivalent in
some sense to a loss of their personal freedom and liberty. If the
Supreme Court decides that restitution orders serve a civil purpose, it
should exempt those made to governments from that decision.
CONCLUSION
Restitution serves the traditional aims of punishment-retribution,
deterrence, and rehabilitation-as well as the minimum goal of
symbolic victim compensation, with the single act of having the
offender make payments directly to the victim.4"' The fact that some
2515, 2536-37 (using a victim of a purse snatching as an example of a human crime
victim that would benefit from a restitution award).
398. See supra note 95.
399. See supra notes 95, 119-22 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1984) (equating the "penal purposes" of restitution
orders to that of fines "payable to the Treasury").
400. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
401. See Brown, 744 F.2d at 909; Reiff, supra note 52, at 138 (noting that the value
of restitution is not in paying victims but as an "instrument to make the offender more
conscious of his debt to the victim"); Schafer, supra note 37, at 122 ("Restitution is
not intended for the recovery of a debt but for the reparation of a criminal injury.");
id. at 124-25 (advocating that restitution directly to a victim has a greater internal
punishment value to the offender than the payment of a fine to the state); see also
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federal courts have attempted to detach, separate, and minimize
restitution's punitive nucleus from its companion goal of victim
compensation lacks an historical and logical foundation. The
Supreme Court should grant a petition of certiorari on the proper case
to rule that the VWPA and MVRA are statutes that impose criminal
punishment that are in addition to any other punishment that a court
can legally inflict on a defendant. By doing so, the Court would
reduce inconsistent federal judicial opinions, and bring a measure of
predictability to the imposition of restitution orders nationwide.
Laurie Ervin & Anne Schneider, Explaining the Effects of Restitution on Offenders:
Results from a National Experiment in Juvenile Courts, in Restitution and
Reconciliation, supra note 51, at 183 (reporting on a study that showed that juvenile
offenders who participated in restitution programs showed significantly less
recidivism than those that participated in traditional programs without restitution).
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